

Chamber	Reweighting	No. elections atypically favoring Rep.		No. elections atypically favoring Dem.	
		Prob < 1%	Prob < 0.1%	Prob < 1%	Prob < 0.1%
Senate	Original	10	8	0	0
Senate	$w_{pop} \uparrow 20\%$	10	8	0	0
Senate	$w_{pop} \downarrow 20\%$	10	8	0	0
Senate	$w_{PP} \uparrow 20\%$	11	8	0	0
Senate	$w_{PP} \downarrow 20\%$	10	8	0	0
Senate	$w_M \uparrow 20\%$	10	8	0	0
Senate	$w_M \downarrow 20\%$	10	8	0	0
House	Original	7	5	0	0
House	$w_{pop} \uparrow 20\%$	7	5	0	0
House	$w_{pop} \downarrow 20\%$	7	5	0	0
House	$w_{PP} \uparrow 20\%$	7	5	1	0
House	$w_{PP} \downarrow 20\%$	7	5	0	0
House	$w_M \uparrow 20\%$	6	5	1	0
House	$w_M \downarrow 20\%$	7	5	0	0

TABLE 2. Of the 17 considered elections, we count the number of elections in which the enacted plan is a 1% outlier and a 0.1% outlier favoring either the Republicans or the Democrats when we reweight our score function. We find two cases in which the Democrats elect more seats than 99% of plans in the ensemble, and no cases in which the Democrats elect more seats than 99.9% of plans in the ensemble. In both of these cases, the election data is taken from the 2012 Governor’s race, which yields a Republican supermajority in the enacted plan. We find a significant number of elections in which the Republicans elected more seats than expected to an extreme extent. As in my original report, w_{pop} , w_{PP} , and w_M refer to the population, Polsby-Popper, and municipal weights, respectively.