

# **UPGRADING NORTH CAROLINA'S BAIL SYSTEM: A BALANCED APPROACH TO PRETRIAL JUSTICE USING LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES**



**John Clark, Pretrial Justice Institute  
Timothy R. Schnacke, Center for Legal and  
Evidence-Based Practices  
Sue Ferrere, Pretrial Justice Institute**

**August 15, 2016**

Copyright © 2016 by the Pretrial Justice Institute. All rights reserved.  
Gaithersburg, MD

Updated August 2016

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .....	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	iv
Judicial officials should immediately begin issuing unsecured bonds for pretrial release instead of secured bonds.....	v
I. ACHIEVING A BALANCED APPROACH TO PRETRIAL RELEASE THROUGH LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES.....	1
The law requires a balanced approach.....	2
The empirical evidence supports a balanced approach.....	3
An unbalanced approach adversely impacts defendants, particularly those of color, and taxpayers.....	5
A national movement for legal and evidence-based pretrial justice is underway .....	6
Legal and evidence-based practices produce excellent results.....	9
II. PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA: CURRENT PRACTICES.....	11
Analysis of Jail Data .....	11
Analysis of Process.....	16
III. LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL JUSTICE PRACTICES: MODELS FOR NORTH CAROLINA.....	19
Risk assessment.....	19
Release/Detention Matrix.....	23
Risk Management .....	23
Citations.....	24
Prosecutor involvement at the initial hearing .....	25
Defense representation .....	25
Bond review of defendants unable to post bond .....	26
Data/performance measures.....	26
IV. PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE LEGAL STRUCTURE .....	28
Prerequisites to Understanding the Legal Analysis.....	28
The History of Bail and the Fundamental Legal Principles.....	29
Current North Carolina Legal Structure .....	30
North Carolina Laws: The Right to Release and Authority to Preventively Detain High Risk Defendants Generally .....	32
North Carolina Law: Underlying Assumptions.....	34
North Carolina Law: Preventive Detention of High Risk Defendants.....	36
North Carolina Law: The Release Process .....	37
North Carolina Law: The Role of Local Pretrial Release Policies .....	39
Legal Framework Needed to Implement Legal and Evidence-Based Practices in North Carolina .....	40
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .....	43
Short-Term Recommendations .....	43
Mid-Term Recommendations .....	48
Long-Term Recommendations.....	48
APPENDIX A. VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT .....	50
APPENDIX B. VIRGINIA PRETRIAL PRAXIS .....	51
APPENDIX C. VIRGINIA DIFFERENTIAL PRETRIAL SUPERVISION.....	52
APPENDIX D. EXAMPLES OF VISION STATEMENTS .....	53
APPENDIX E. FACTORS INCLUDED IN THE ARNOLD FOUNDATION PSA COURT RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL.....	55

## PREFACE

The North Carolina Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice contracted, through the National Center for State Courts with the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) to produce a report containing evidence-based recommendations to improve North Carolina’s pretrial justice system.

The Pretrial Justice Institute is a market-driven organization that advances safe, fair and effective pretrial justice that honors and protects all people. We do this by monitoring the state of policy and practice across the states, convening communities of practice to reach common goals, communicating about the law and research to diverse groups of people, demonstrating that moving from resource- to risk-based decision-making is possible, and operating with business discipline.

Below are several terms that appear in this report, and definitions for how those terms are used.

**Bail:** Based on legal and historical research as well as accepted notions underlying pretrial social science research, “bail” is defined as a process of conditional pretrial release.<sup>1</sup> Technically, bail is not money. States should not be faulted for blurring the concepts of money (a condition of release) and bail (release) because for roughly 1,500 years, paying money (or giving up property before that) was the only condition used in England and America to provide reasonable assurance of court appearance. Nevertheless, recognizing that bail is not money helps states move forward in their efforts to improve pretrial justice without unnecessary confusion.

North Carolina defines bail as money, (G.S. 15A-531(4); G.S. 58-71-1(2)), but this definition does not appear to pose the major problems we see in other states, such as constitutional “right to bail” provisions. When trying to articulate the right that North Carolina defendants enjoy, however, at least some local pretrial release policies contain quotes from U.S. Supreme court opinions equating the “right to bail” with the “right to release” before trial and the “right to freedom before conviction.” Making sense of these and other statements made about bail throughout its history requires an understanding that bail means release.

At its core, pretrial justice is simply an attempt to release and detain the right defendants, using legal and evidence-based practices to create rational, fair, and transparent pretrial processes. Except when necessary to make some point, this report will mostly avoid using the word “bail” in favor of the term “release.” When the term bail is used, however, such as describing “money-based bail practices” or making various references to the bail literature, the reader should recognize that the authors define “bail” as a process of conditional pretrial release.

---

<sup>1</sup> Timothy R. Schnacke, *Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform*, National Institute of Corrections, (2014), [hereinafter *Fundamentals*].

**Empirically-derived risk assessment:** A core element of evidence-based pretrial justice practices is the use of an objective risk assessment tool that has been constructed and tested on the basis of research demonstrating the tool’s success in sorting defendants into categories showing their probabilities of appearance in court and of completing the pretrial period without any arrests for new criminal activity. This paper uses the term “empirically-derived risk assessment” to describe such tools.

**Legal and evidence-based practices:** Legal and evidence-based practices are “interventions and practices that are consistent with the pretrial legal foundation, applicable laws, and methods research has proven to be effective in decreasing failures to appear in court and danger to the community during the pretrial stage. The term is intended to reinforce the uniqueness of the field of pretrial services and ensure that criminal justice professionals remain mindful that program practices are often driven by law and when driven by research, they must be consistent with the pretrial legal foundation and the underlying legal principles.”<sup>2</sup>

**Secured bond:** As used in this report, a secured bond is one that requires a financial condition be met before a defendant can be released from custody. That condition can be met by payment of the bond amount by the defendant or others (e.g., family or friends) or by guarantee of payment by a licensed commercial bail bonding company.

**Unsecured bond:** An unsecured bond is one in which the defendant pays no money to the court in order to be released, but is liable for the full amount of the bond upon his or her failure to appear in court.

---

<sup>2</sup> Marie VanNostrand, Legal and Evidence-Based Practices: Applications of Legal Principles, Laws and Research to the Field of Pretrial Services, Nat’l Inst. of Corr. (2007), at 12.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report focuses on helping North Carolina officials work toward a balanced approach to achieving the three goals of the pretrial release decision-making process: to provide reasonable assurance of the safety of the community; to provide reasonable assurance of appearance in court; and to maximize pretrial release. It does so by focusing on legal and evidence-based practices—ones that fully comport with the law and that are driven by research. The use of such practices has been fully endorsed by all the key justice system stakeholder groups, including: the Conference of Chief Justices; the Conference of State Court Administrators; the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the National Sheriffs' Association; the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys; the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association; the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the National Association of Counties; and the American Bar Association. And the use of such practices has been shown to produce excellent results.

Except for very promising work being done in Mecklenburg County, legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices are not in place in North Carolina. Magistrates and judges in the state place significant emphasis on an antiquated tool—bond guidelines—which several federal courts around the country have recently called unconstitutional. Courts also rely heavily on a release option—the secured bond—that was established in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century to address a problem that was unique to that time; the ability of a criminal defendant to flee into the vast wilderness of America's growing frontier and simply disappear, never to face prosecution. And only 40 of the state's 100 counties are served by pretrial services programs that can provide supervision of defendants released by the court with conditions of pretrial release. Many of these programs have very limited supervision capacity.

The model for legal and evidence-based pretrial release practices in North Carolina includes the use of an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool, the development of a decision matrix that would help magistrates and judges make pretrial release decisions, the implementation of risk management strategies aimed at matching risk levels with the most appropriate level of support or supervision, the expanded use of citation releases by law enforcement, the very early involvement of the prosecutor and defense, and the initiation of automatic bond reviews for in-custody misdemeanor defendants.

Implementing such a model of legal and evidence-based practices in North Carolina would be greatly facilitated by changes in the state's laws. Current North Carolina law does not expressly provide for a right to actual pretrial release—it is crafted only in terms of setting or not setting conditions—nor does it articulate a procedure for preventive detention of high risk defendants. A right merely to have conditions set, coupled with the statutory provisions discussing those conditions as well as no decent process for risk-based detention, naturally moves North Carolina magistrates and judges toward using secured money conditions to address risk for both court appearance and public safety, and toward attempting to use unattainable money conditions to detain defendants posing extremely high pretrial risk. In addition, although the statute speaks of pretrial risk, it makes determinations of who is entitled to having release

conditions set based primarily on charge as a proxy for risk, and subtly points judicial officials toward using the money condition to address risk. The better practice would be to set forth a right to release for all except extremely high-risk defendants (or defendants who are not as risky but who also face extremely serious charges, or both), provide for a lawful and transparent detention provision based on risk to allow pretrial detention with no conditions, and then create mechanisms so that persons released pretrial are released immediately.

Based on this review of pretrial justice in North Carolina, the following actions are recommended.

#### Short-Term Recommendations:

- Judicial officials should immediately begin issuing unsecured bonds for pretrial release instead of secured bonds.
- State officials should appoint a Legal and Evidence-Based Practices Implementation Team to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of this report.
- The Implementation Team should develop a vision statement for a state-wide, data-driven pretrial justice system in North Carolina.
- The Implementation Team should develop an Implementation Plan based upon the vision statement, with a focus on initially implementing the plan in 5 to 7 pilot counties.
- The Implementation Team should incorporate the following elements in its plan:
  - The use of an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool by every magistrate in every criminal case at the initial appearance
  - The use of a release/detention matrix that factors risk level and charge type
  - The development of differentiated risk management procedures that match the identified risk to the appropriate supervision level
  - The expanded use of citations by law enforcement
  - Early involvement of prosecutor and defense counsel
  - The institution of automatic bond review procedures for misdemeanor defendants
  - Uniform data reporting standards.
- The Implementation Team should draft language for bills or proposed court rules that incorporate the changes in law needed to implement the plan in the pilot counties.
  - The Implementation Team should develop a preventive detention framework for defendants who present unacceptably high risk
  - The Implementation Team should develop a release framework for defendants who are not detained
  - The Implementation Team should draft other legislation and/or court rules needed to implement the recommendations in this report

#### Mid-Term Recommendations:

- The Implementation Team should fully implement the plan in the pilot counties.

- The Implementation Team should ensure that all staff with a role in implementing the plan are fully informed of its purpose and rationale and trained for successful implementation.
- The Implementation Team should establish a data dashboard to monitor outcomes and regularly review the data and make appropriate adjustments to the plan.

#### Long-Term Recommendations:

- The Implementation Team should begin implementing the plan in the remaining counties of the state.
- The Implementation Team should develop a plan for sustaining changes that have been made and holding accountable those who make the changes.
- North Carolina officials should consider what role, if any, secured bonds should continue to play in the state's pretrial system, and draft appropriate proposals for statutory or court rule amendments.

As the Commission recognizes, implementing these recommendations will not be easy, but the benefits that will flow from doing so will be worth the effort. A well-functioning legal and evidence-based pretrial release process benefits justice system officials who can better see, and thus have greater control over, the process and the extent to which it is achieving the three goals of the pretrial release decision. It also benefits defendants going through the system, reducing instances of racial disparities, giving all defendants a sense of procedural justice, and upholding their Constitutional rights. It benefits victims, giving them perceptions of safety and predictability, and improving their chances of experiencing reparations for harm done to them. Finally, it benefits taxpayers, who have a better understanding of how their taxes are being spent and what outcomes they are getting.

## I. ACHIEVING A BALANCED APPROACH TO PRETRIAL RELEASE THROUGH LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES

There are three goals of the pretrial release decision: (1) to provide reasonable assurance of the safety of the public; (2) to provide reasonable assurance of the appearance of defendants in court; and (3) to provide due process for those accused of a crime, with “[t]he law favor[ing] the release of defendants pending adjudication of charges.”<sup>3</sup> When jurisdictions focus on one or two of these goals at the expense of a balanced approach considering all three, the inevitable result is a dysfunctional system where many defendants who could be safely released remain in jail and many others who pose unacceptably high risks are released.

It is becoming increasingly clear that an option developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century – the secured bond – is inherently incapable of achieving the balanced approach that effective 21<sup>st</sup> Century public policy demands. When first introduced, the assumption that a secured bond provided a financial incentive for a defendant to appear in court gave justice system officials some hope in addressing at least one of the three goals of pretrial release. And since the capability to empirically test this assumption did not exist, this assumption became an article of faith, and it remains so today in many jurisdictions. In accepting this assumption, courts developed tools, such as those currently used in many North Carolina local pretrial release policies, that assume that the maximum sentence that defendants face defines their level of risk, and that a dollar amount that falls within a suggested range is the best way to address those risks.

Justice system officials across the country have relied on the secured bond option so often and for so long, not because there was evidence that it was effective, but because familiarity has bred acceptance – and because the commercial bail bonds industry that has benefited financially from its continued use has fought against any proposals or actions to implement new, evidence-based practices.<sup>4</sup>

Information showing how ill-suited secured bonds are in achieving the goals of the pretrial release decision can no longer be ignored. Science has provided new, evidence-based tools that show how to achieve the balanced approach, and do so in a way that aligns with the requirements of the law. States around the country, including, now, North Carolina, are looking at the science with the aim of creating a balanced system of pretrial justice that is supported by research and that honors the spirit and the letter of the law.

---

<sup>3</sup> *American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.) Pretrial Release* (2007) Std. 10-1.1, at 1.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example: [https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/29/a-professional-bounty-hunter-who-likes-the-bail-system-just-the-way-it-is?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=newsletter&utm\\_source=opening-statement&utm\\_term=newsletter-20160630-530#.N7zxLibBb](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/06/29/a-professional-bounty-hunter-who-likes-the-bail-system-just-the-way-it-is?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=opening-statement&utm_term=newsletter-20160630-530#.N7zxLibBb).

## The law requires a balanced approach

The law favors the release of defendants pending trial. As summed up by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in a 1951 case:

The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty. Without this conditional privilege, even those wrongly accused are punished by a period of imprisonment while awaiting trial and are handicapped in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense.<sup>5</sup>

But the law also recognizes that some defendants pose unmanageable risks to public safety and non-appearance, and can, if strict procedural steps are followed, be held without bond.<sup>6</sup>

An examination of the history of bail and pretrial release reveals that for centuries, dating back to Medieval England, bail was an “in or out” proposition. Defendants who were bailable under the law were to be released, and those who were non-bailable were to be detained. This system carried over from England to this country during the colonial period and after independence. It was in the mid-1800’s, when defendants found it easy to flee and disappear into parts of the growing country that the idea of secured bonds came about. By 1900, the secured bond system had given rise to the for-profit bail bonding industry. Almost immediately afterwards, and numerous times since, analysts drew attention to the dysfunctions of the pretrial release system that relied on secured bonds.<sup>7</sup> As one researcher noted almost 90 years ago: “In too many instances, the present system neither guarantees security to society nor safeguards the rights of the accused. It is lax with those with whom it should be stringent and stringent with those with whom it could safely be less severe.”<sup>8</sup>

The legal issues raised by the use of secured bonds are now receiving attention by the federal courts. In the past two years, number of cases have been filed in federal courts challenging the use of secured bonds on the grounds that requiring indigent defendants to post financial bonds as a pre-condition to release violates their 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment equal protection rights. The civil rights law firm Equal Justice Under Law (EJUL) has amassed almost a dozen victories in class action challenges to money bail systems in several states, including Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Mississippi.<sup>9</sup> These suits have forced the courts in those jurisdictions to drastically reform their bail-setting practices.

---

<sup>5</sup> *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951); see also *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society, liberty is the norm and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”)

<sup>6</sup> *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 755.

<sup>7</sup> *Fundamentals*, *supra* note 1, at 35-48.

<sup>8</sup> Arthur L. Beeley, *The Bail System in Chicago*, (1927, reprinted 1966).

<sup>9</sup> For information on these suits, go to the EJUL website at: <http://www.equaljusticeunderlaw.org>.

## The empirical evidence supports a balanced approach

The research has clearly identified several negative consequences of using an unbalanced approach to pretrial release. The first of these consequences is the large number of bailable defendants who remain in jail for either a portion or the entirety of the pretrial period because they cannot meet the condition of their release – posting a secured bond. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately 460,000 persons were being held in jails throughout the United States on June 30, 2014 awaiting disposition of their charges, representing 63% of all jail inmates.<sup>10</sup> While not all of these defendants are bailable, most are. 89% of detained felony defendants in a national survey remained in custody throughout the pretrial period on secured bonds that were never posted.<sup>11</sup> As shown in Section II of this report, there are large numbers of persons sitting in North Carolina jails because of inability to meet their release condition – posting a secured bond.

A second consequence of using an unbalanced approach is the impact of short-term incarceration – the few days it may take a person who does have the financial resources to post a secured bond to come up with the money to do so. One study found that, when *controlling for other factors*, defendants who had scored as low risk on the empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool and who were held in jail for just 2-3 days after arrest were 39% more likely to be arrested on a new charge while the first case was pending than those who were released on the first day, and 22% more likely to fail to appear. Low risk defendants who were held 4-7 days were 50% more likely to be arrested, and 22% more likely to fail to appear; those held -14 days were 56% more likely to have a new charge and 41% more likely to have a failure to appear. The same patterns held for medium risk defendants who were in jail for short periods.<sup>12</sup> While the study did not explore why short-term incarceration leads to these findings, they may simply reflect the disruption caused to people's lives by being in jail for just a few days.

In short, being held in jail for just a few days while making financial arrangements for a secured bond negatively impacts all three goals of the pretrial release decision: it delays release, it leads to higher rates of new criminal activity, and it leads to higher rates of failure to appear in court.

There are also major consequences for low and moderate risk defendants who remain incarcerated throughout the pretrial period, unable to post secured bonds. The same study also found that, again *controlling for other factors*, low risk defendants who were held in jail throughout the pretrial period due to their inability to post their bonds were 28% more likely to recidivate within 24 months after adjudication than low risk defendants who were released pretrial. Medium risk defendants detained

---

<sup>10</sup> Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, *Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014*, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2015).

<sup>11</sup> Brian A. Reaves, *Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 – Statistical Tables*, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2013), at 17.

<sup>12</sup> Christopher Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand, and Alex Holsinger, *The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention*, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2013), [hereinafter *Hidden Costs*].

throughout the pretrial period were 30% more likely to recidivate within the following two years.<sup>13</sup>

Such results might be palatable if secured money bonds were found to be more effective in terms of public safety and court appearance. The for-profit bail bonding industry routinely cites studies purporting to show that that is the case, relying on data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Despite repeated claims to the contrary by the commercial bail bonding industry, the BJS data survey was not designed to make assessments of the effectiveness of one type of bond over any other type.<sup>14</sup> As a result of these claims by the bail bonding industry, BJS took the highly unusual step of issuing a Data Advisory, warning that its “data are insufficient to explain causal associations between the patterns reported, such as the efficacy of one type of pretrial release over another.”<sup>15</sup>

One study, however, overcomes the methodological flaws of research cited by the bonding industry, by controlling for risk levels and allowing for valid comparisons. That study found that, across all risk levels, there were no statistically significant differences in outcomes (i.e. court appearance and public safety rates) between defendants released without having to post financial bonds and those released after posting such a bond. The study also looked at the jail bed usage of defendants on the two types of bonds. Defendants who did not have to post financial bonds before being released spent far less time in jail than defendants who had to post. This is not surprising, since defendants with secured bonds must find the money to satisfy the bond or make arrangements with a bail bonding company in order to obtain release. Also, 39% of defendants with secured bonds were never able to raise the money and spent the entire pretrial period in jail. In summary, the study found that unsecured bonds, which do not require defendants to post money before being released, offer the same public safety and court appearance benefits as secured bonds, but do so with substantially less use of jail bed space.<sup>16</sup> Unlike any of the studies cited by the for-profit bail bonding industry, this study looked at all three goals of the pretrial release decision – safety, appearance, and release.

It is not surprising that secured money bonds have no impact on public safety rates. Secured bonds allow defendants who have access to money to purchase their pretrial release, regardless of the risk they may pose to public safety. Ironically, under

---

<sup>13</sup> Id.

<sup>14</sup> Kristen Bechtel, John Clark, Michael R. Jones, and David Levin, *Dispelling the Myths: What Policy Makers Need to Know About Pretrial Research*, Pretrial Justice Institute (2012).

<sup>15</sup> Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Data Advisory: State Court Processing Statistics Data Limitations* (2010), at 1. The State Court Processing Statistics Project collected data on the processing of felony cases in 40 on the nation’s 75 largest counties. Among the data elements collected were: was the defendant released during the pretrial period; if so, what type of release; and what was the failure to appear rate and rate of new criminal activity by type of release. The project’s methodology was not designed to make sure that the release type groups were similar when looking at failure to appear and new criminal activity rates by release type, which is why the Bureau of Justice Statistics issued the Advisory to make clear that any such comparisons were invalid.

<sup>16</sup> Michael R. Jones, *Unsecured Bonds: The “As Effective” and “Most Efficient” Pretrial Release Option* (2013), [hereinafter *Unsecured Bonds*]. This study was conducted from data on 1,970 defendants from 10 different counties in Colorado in 2011.

this system, magistrates and judges actually may make it easier for defendants deemed to pose unacceptable public safety risks to get out, when, to address those risks, they set high secured bond amounts. While the intent of the judicial officer may be that the defendant will not be able to post the bond, the economic reality is that the higher the bond amount, the higher the profit margin for the bonding company that does business with a high-danger-risk defendant. For example, a commercial bail bonding company might make \$1,500 from a \$10,000 bond, but the company can earn \$15,000 from a \$100,000 bond, giving the company a greater incentive to write a higher bond.<sup>17</sup>

And since the bonding company is only liable for bond forfeiture if the defendant fails to appear in court – not if the defendant is arrested for new criminal activity while on pretrial release – bonding out high-danger-risk, high-bond defendants is a no-risk venture for the company. It is not surprising that research shows that about half of high-danger risk defendants get out of jail pending trial.<sup>18</sup>

### *An unbalanced approach adversely impacts defendants, particularly those of color, and taxpayers*

Research has consistently shown that, all else being equal, defendants who are detained throughout the pretrial period receive much harsher outcomes than those who obtain release.<sup>19</sup> A recent study quantified just how harsh these outcomes are for those found by an empirically-derived risk assessment tool to be low and moderate risk. The study found that low risk defendants who were detained throughout the pretrial period were five times more likely to get a jail sentence and four times more likely to get a prison sentence than their low risk counterparts who were released pretrial. Medium risk defendants who were detained pretrial were four times more likely to get a jail sentence and three times more likely to get a prison sentence. Both low and medium risk defendants who were detained pretrial also received much longer jail and prison sentences than their counterparts who spent the pretrial period in the community.<sup>20</sup>

Disparities unleashed by secured money bonds fall most heavily on racial minorities. Studies have consistently shown that African American defendants have higher secured bond amounts and are detained on secured bonds at higher rates than white defendants, a factor contributing to the disproportionate confinement of persons of color.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> *Rational and Transparent Bail Decision Making: Moving From a Cash-Based to a Risk-Based Process*, Pretrial Justice Institute (2012), at 8-9, [hereinafter *Rational and Transparent*].

<sup>18</sup> Laura and John Arnold Foundation, *Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment: Research Summary* (2013).

<sup>19</sup> *Rational and Transparent*, *supra* note 17, at 2.

<sup>20</sup> Christopher Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand, and Alex Holsinger, *Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes*, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2013).

<sup>21</sup> Traci Schlesinger, *Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing*, 22 JUST Q., 170, 187 (2005); Stephen Demuth, *Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release and Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black and White Felony Arrestees*, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 873, 880-81 (2003).

Requiring defendants to post financial bonds as a pre-condition to being released pretrial has obvious implications for those of low economic means – even when they are able to pay the bondsman’s fees, usually about 15% of the full value of the bond. The money may have come out of family funds for groceries or the next month’s rent. And, of course, those who are unable to make a bond payment may fall into deeper economic despair through the loss of jobs and housing while in pretrial confinement.

North Carolina citizens seem to understand how the state’s justice system impacts those with little money, and those of certain racial and ethnic groups. A 2015 survey of state residents showed that 64% of respondents believe that low-income people are likely to receive unfair treatment from the courts. Forty-seven percent felt that African Americans were treated more harshly, including 67% of African American respondents who felt that way, and 46% of respondents felt that Hispanics received worse treatment.<sup>22</sup>

Detaining persons pretrial also greatly impacts taxpayers, with no return benefit. It has been estimated that budgets for the operation of county jails rose from \$5.7 billion in 1983 to \$22.2 billion in 2011. These figures do not, however, take into consideration the costs that come out of other county budget lines, such as employee pension benefits and contracted health care to jail inmates, leaving the total costs to taxpayers unknown. “Because the costs provided are too often incomplete, policymakers and the public are seldom aware of the full extent of their community’s financial commitment to the operations of the local jail. Given the outsize role that jails play in the country’s criminal justice system – incarcerating millions of people annually – it is striking that the national price tag for jails remains unknown and that taxpayers who foot most of the bill remain unaware of what their dollars are buying.”<sup>23</sup> And given the significant growth in jail spending, it is not surprising that 40% of jails in a national survey state that reducing jail costs is one of their most serious issues.<sup>24</sup>

In short, the current system produces no discernable benefits for anyone, except for one group – the for-profit bail bonding industry. It is not surprising, then, that the industry fights every effort to introduce legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices.

### *A national movement for legal and evidence-based pretrial justice is underway*

Ignoring the protests of the commercial bail bonding industry, over the past four years, there have been significant and unprecedented calls from key and diverse justice system stakeholders for implementing legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices aimed at making sure that only those who pose unmanageable risks are detained pretrial.

---

<sup>22</sup> *Elon University Poll, State Courts, October 29-November 2, 2015* (2015), at 4.

<sup>23</sup> Christian Henrichson, Joshua Rinaldi, and Ruth Delaney, *The Price of Jails: Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration*, Vera Inst. Justice, 5 (2015).

<sup>24</sup> Natalie R. Ortiz, *County Jails at a Crossroads: An Examination of the Jail Population and Pretrial Release*, Nat’l Assn. of Counties, (2015), at 8.

For example, in 2012, after a year of study, the Conference of State Court Administrators issued a Policy Paper concluding that “[m]any of those incarcerated pretrial do not present a substantial risk of failure to appear or a threat to public safety, but do lack the financial means to be released. Conversely, some with financial means are released despite a risk of flight or threat to public safety, ...” The Policy Paper went on to say that “[e]vidence-based assessment of the risk a defendant will fail to appear or will endanger others if released can increase successful pretrial release without financial conditions that many defendants are unable to meet. Imposing conditions on a defendant that are appropriate for that individual following a valid pretrial assessment substantially reduces pretrial detention without impairing the judicial process or threatening public safety.”<sup>25</sup>

Endorsing this Policy Paper, the Conference of Chief Justices issued a resolution that “urge(d) that court leaders promote, collaborate, and accomplish the adoption of evidence-based assessment of risk in setting pretrial release conditions and advocate for the presumptive use of non-financial release conditions to the greatest degree consistent with evidence-based assessment of flight risk and threat to public safety and to victims of crime.”<sup>26</sup>

Several other national associations also have issued policy statements or resolutions calling for bail reform. These include: the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the American Jail Association, the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Probation and Parole Association, and the National Association of Counties.<sup>27</sup>

These organizations, along with the National Judicial College, the National Center for State Courts, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Court Management, the National Criminal Justice Association, the Global Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, the National Organization for Victim Assistance, along with dozens of other groups and individuals, are members of a Pretrial Justice Working Group, convened by the PJI and the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice to pursue legal and evidence-based enhancements to pretrial justice.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> *Evidence-Based Pretrial Release* Policy Paper available on the National Center for State Court’s website at:

<http://cosca.ncsc.org/~media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20-Final.ashx>.

<sup>26</sup> Resolution available at the National Center for State Court’s website at:

<http://ccj.ncsc.org/~media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/Resolutions/01302013-pretrial-release-Endorsing-COSCA-Paper-EvidenceBased-Pretrial-Release.ashx>.

<sup>27</sup> Statements available at <http://www.pretrial.org/get-involved/pretrial-national-coalition/>.

<sup>28</sup> Information on Working Group progress available at:

<http://www.pretrial.org/download/infostop/Implementing%20the%20Recommendations%20of%20the%20National%20Symposium%20on%20Pretrial%20Justice-%20The%202013%20Progress%20Report.pdf>.

North Carolina is not alone in exploring bail reform. Legislatures in four states – Colorado, Kentucky, New Jersey and Alaska – recently re-wrote their bail laws to bring them in line with legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices.<sup>29</sup> Several other states, including Arizona, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah, have commissions or task forces examining statutory or court rule changes needed to incorporate legal and evidence-based practices.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Colorado House Bill 13-1236 (2013), Kentucky House Bill 463 (2011), New Jersey Senate Bill 946 (2014), Alaska Senate Bill 91 (2016).

<sup>30</sup> In Arizona, the Chief Justice has appointed a Task Force on Fair Justice for All, tasked with identifying what changes are needed to assure that people are “not jailed pending the disposition of charges merely because they are poor.” See:

<http://www.ncsc.org/~media/Microsites/Files/PJCC/Pretrial%20Justice%20Brief%203%20-%20AZ%20final.ashx>. In Indiana, the Chief Justice appointed a Committee to Study Pretrial Release to advise the court on the use of an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool for the state, and on alternatives to secured bonds. See:

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&ved=oahUKEwio3ban2I7OAhWESyYKHbUMCDQ4ChAWCCgwAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncsc.org%2F~%2Fmedia%2FMicrosites%2FFiles%2FPJCC%2FPretrial%2520Justice%2520Brief%25206%2520-%2520IN%252012-30-2015.ashx&usg=AFQjCNEcAouXXDmNV6xWki\\_k91\\_zJc6KrA&bvm=bv.127984354.d.eWE](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=13&ved=oahUKEwio3ban2I7OAhWESyYKHbUMCDQ4ChAWCCgwAg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncsc.org%2F~%2Fmedia%2FMicrosites%2FFiles%2FPJCC%2FPretrial%2520Justice%2520Brief%25206%2520-%2520IN%252012-30-2015.ashx&usg=AFQjCNEcAouXXDmNV6xWki_k91_zJc6KrA&bvm=bv.127984354.d.eWE). In Maine, the governor, chief justice, president of the senate and speaker of the house, have established a Task Force on Pretrial Justice Reform charged with producing recommendations for legislative action that will “reduce the financial and human costs of pretrial incarceration” without compromising public safety or the integrity of the criminal justice system. The directive establishing the task force is available at:

[http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine\\_courts/committees/2015%20PJR.pdf](http://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/2015%20PJR.pdf). In Maryland, the governor appointed a Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial Release System; the Commission issued a report calling for statewide pretrial risk assessment using empirically-derived risk assessments. The Commission report is available at:

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=oahUKEwiOm7upo47OAhvVG2yYKHdXYAk4QFggpMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fgocep.maryland.gov%2Fpretrial%2Fdocuments%2F2014-pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHRPiZKczlN7kKA2ItgW\\_sMU19sLw&bvm=bv.127984354.d.eWE](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=oahUKEwiOm7upo47OAhvVG2yYKHdXYAk4QFggpMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fgocep.maryland.gov%2Fpretrial%2Fdocuments%2F2014-pretrial-commission-final-report.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHRPiZKczlN7kKA2ItgW_sMU19sLw&bvm=bv.127984354.d.eWE). In Nevada, the Supreme Court appointed a Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release with the purpose of identifying an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool for that state. Information about that committee is available at: <http://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Templates/documents.aspx?folderID=19312>. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court appointed an Ad Hoc Pretrial Release Committee to make recommendations for rule changes that would incorporate legal and evidence-based pretrial release practices. See:

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=oahUKEwiggrXQ107OAhVNySYKHaHBAP4QFggzMAM&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov%2Fuploads%2FFileLinks%2F68d7e94c91244c3582e80b8272c30db1%2F2015\\_55.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHYXvihSggAhjTD7AW61\\_kc--eHqg](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=oahUKEwiggrXQ107OAhVNySYKHaHBAP4QFggzMAM&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsupremecourt.nmcourts.gov%2Fuploads%2FFileLinks%2F68d7e94c91244c3582e80b8272c30db1%2F2015_55.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHYXvihSggAhjTD7AW61_kc--eHqg). In Texas, the Chief Justice has appointed a Criminal Justice Committee under the Texas Judicial Council to explore ways of enhancing pretrial justice in that state. See:

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=oahUKEwjWr63loY7OAhXEOiYKHSXjA4MQFggkMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.txcourts.gov%2Ftjc%2Fnews%2Fjudicial-council-creates-criminal-justice-committee.aspx&usg=AFQjCNFDRc6uwig2-qgCDRveQj6nSLepoAA>. In Utah, a committee of the Utah Judicial Council, the rule-making body for the judiciary, has recommended court rule changes that would include a clear statement of the presumption of release, free of financial conditions; use of a risk assessment for every defendant booked into a jail in the state; the availability across the state of supervision for moderate- and higher-risk defendants; and uniform, statewide data collection on relevant pretrial process and outcome measures. *Report to the Utah Judicial Council on Pretrial Release and Supervision Practices*, Utah State Courts, November 2015.

## *Legal and evidence-based practices produce excellent results*

Interest is growing in legal and evidence-based practices because they work. The District of Columbia provides one example of what can happen when a jurisdiction implements such practices. In DC, the pretrial services program, using an empirically-derived risk assessment tool, either recommends non-financial release – with or without conditions, depending on the assessed risk level – or that a hearing be held to determine whether the defendant should be held without bond. The program never recommends a monetary bond. The program also supervises conditions of release imposed by the court and sends court date reminder notices to all released defendants. The outcomes are impressive – 80% of defendants are released on non-monetary bonds and 15% are held without bond. The remaining 5% are held on other charges. Of those released, during FY 2012, 89% made all of their court appearances and 88% were not rearrested on new charges while their cases are pending. Only 1% was rearrested for a violent offense. Moreover, 88% of defendants remained on release at the conclusion of their cases without a revocation for non-compliance with release conditions.<sup>31</sup> These results were achieved without the use of secured money bonds.

Kentucky provides another example. In 2011, Kentucky began implementing the latest in legal and evidence-based practices, including reducing reliance on monetary bonds and basing recommendations on the results of an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool. In the first two years after introducing these practices, the non-financial pretrial release rate went from 50% to 66%, with no negative impact on court appearance and public safety rates. In fact, the court appearance rate inched up from 89% to 91% and the public safety rate from 91% to 92%.<sup>32</sup> In 2013, Kentucky's statewide pretrial services program began using an empirically-derived risk assessment tool developed and tested by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, the Public Safety Assessment–Court (PSA–Court). This tool was constructed after a study of over a million cases from jurisdictions all across the country. It is designed to be universal; that is, it can perform well in every jurisdiction in the country. A study conducted after the first six months of use in Kentucky showed that pretrial release rates rose to 70% of all defendants, and the increased release rate was accompanied by a 15% reduction in new criminal activity of defendants on pretrial release.<sup>33</sup>

In North Carolina, Mecklenburg County has been using the Arnold Foundation's PSA–Court tool since 2014. Mecklenburg County's pretrial services program, which administers this tool, also has developed a release matrix that combines a risk score and charge severity to arrive at a recommendation by the program regarding release.<sup>34</sup> An analysis of how PSA–Court was performing in Mecklenburg County after the first three months showed that it was successfully sorting defendants into risk categories for both

---

<sup>31</sup> *Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia: FY 2012 Organizational Assessment*, Dist. of Col. Pretrial Services Agency (2012), at 10.

<sup>32</sup> *Pretrial Reform in Kentucky*, Administrative Office of the Courts, Kentucky Courts of Justice (2013).

<sup>33</sup> *Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Kentucky*, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2014).

<sup>34</sup> See *infra* p. 23 (discussing such matrices in general).

new criminal activity and failure to appear. For both of these outcomes, failure rates were lowest for those defendants scored by the tool as low risk, rising in step as the risk levels rose. The data also showed that pretrial release rates were highest for the lowest risk group, and declined in step with the rises in risk, meaning that judicial officials were using the results of the risk assessment tool to help make decisions. These actions resulted in a 93% public safety rate and a 98% court appearance rate in 2015,<sup>35</sup> with no increase in reported crime.

---

<sup>35</sup> Data provided by Jessica Ireland, Mecklenburg County Pretrial Services, 7/19/16. See also: <http://charmeck.org/mecklenburg/county/news/Pages/Mecklenburg-County-Recognized-as-Model-for-Pretrial-Reform.aspx>.


## II. PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA: CURRENT PRACTICES

This section discusses the state of pretrial release in North Carolina with a review of available data and a discussion of the pretrial release process.


### *Analysis of Jail Data*

Commission staff submitted for analysis jail data for six North Carolina counties. The six counties represent 10.3% of North Carolina’s population and are a diverse demographic and geographic mix. They include Buncombe, Cumberland, Johnston and Rowan Counties, all part of larger metropolitan statistical areas, along with less densely populated and rural Carteret and Duplin Counties. The data comprised a “snapshot” of the jail populations in each of the six counties on a recent date.

Overall, on the date that the snapshots were taken, the jails were at 80% capacity (Column Graph 1), ranging from 48% in Duplin County to over-capacity at 111% in Carteret County.




Across the six counties, on the dates of the snapshots, 67% of inmates were pretrial, ranging from a low of 52% in Duplin County to a high of 81% in Cumberland County (column graph below).



Virtually all pretrial detainees (1,268 out of 1,338 or 95%) were detained on cash or secured bond. The remaining 5% (70 detainees) who were being held without bond fell into three offense categories: violent misdemeanors, non-violent felonies, and violent felonies. Most of these (64) belonged to the violent felony category, with many of these being first degree homicide cases.


The top charge for a majority (75%) of pretrial detainees was either a violent (47.5%) or non-violent (27.1%) felony (pie chart below). As discussed in Section IV, by just knowing the top charge, and not the risk levels, of detained defendants, it is not possible to assess whether holding these defendants is a good use of jail space.

### Pretrial Detainees by Offense Type 6 North Carolina Counties




Information regarding the average, high and low bond amount for each of 9 offense categories was provided. In general, the more serious the offense, the higher the bond amount (Table below). However, the ranges were large for all offense categories. For example, bond amounts for individuals charged with a non-violent felony ranged from \$100 to \$2,000,000, violent felonies \$1,000 to \$3,000,000, and drug trafficking \$8,000 to \$2,000,000. The highest average bond amounts (graph below) were for drug trafficking (\$232,131) and violent felonies (\$201,261).

Offense Category	Lowest cash or secured bond amount	Highest cash or secured bond amount	Average cash or secured bond amount
Impaired driving (DWI), any type	\$1,000	\$200,000	\$24,610
Driving while license revoked (DWLR), any type	\$500	\$10,000	\$3,286
Traffic/motor vehicle other than DWI or DWLR	\$500	\$800,000	\$71,827
Misdemeanor drugs/paraphernalia/maint. dwelling	\$200	\$20,000	\$2,248
Drug trafficking	\$8,000	\$2,000,000	\$232,131
Other misdemeanor, non-violent	\$200	\$25,000	\$2,288
Other misdemeanor, violent	\$100	\$75,000	\$6,997
Felony, non-violent	\$100	\$2,000,000	\$63,688
Felony, violent	\$1,000	\$3,000,000	\$201,261




The next chart looks at average days detained. The snapshots that were taken to collect these data show who was in jail on the date of the snapshot for each of the six counties. As such, the data can only show how long defendants were in custody in pretrial status on the date of the snapshot. It cannot show their total length of stay – which would be a more meaningful measure.<sup>36</sup> With that caveat in mind, as the chart below shows, the average number of days detained is directly correlated to the average amount of the bond, that is, individuals stay longer in jail as bond amounts increase. These data must be viewed with the recognition that, as noted earlier, a snapshot of a jail population on a given date can only say how long each person had been in custody as of that date. It cannot provide the total length of stay, which is a much more meaningful figure to know.



African Americans were disproportionately represented in the pretrial population (chart below); although they make up only 18.2% of the population sample, they comprise 47.1% of pretrial detainees. As mentioned above in the discussion of the offense type, it is difficult to know how to put these data into context without knowing the risk level of defendants. This is discussed more in the next section.

<sup>36</sup> To determine total length of stay requires conducting a snapshot of all persons released from jail during a given time period. Time constraints prevented Commission staff from obtaining this information.



### Analysis of Process

Persons arrested in North Carolina are brought “without unnecessary delay” before a magistrate for an initial appearance.<sup>37</sup> At this hearing, with limited exceptions,<sup>38</sup> defendants are entitled to have a pretrial release condition set. In determining those conditions, magistrates must impose the least of the following: written promise to appear; release to the custody of a designated person or organization; unsecured bond; secured bond; and house arrest with electronic monitoring, which must be used with a secured bond.<sup>39</sup>

While the analysis of the jail data suggests that there are large numbers of defendants in North Carolina jails on release conditions that they cannot meet, data are not available for this report to show the extent to which each of the options that are available to the magistrate and judge (i.e., written promise to appear, unsecured bond, secured bond) are used, nor on the ultimate pretrial release rate, rate of new criminal

<sup>37</sup> G.S. 15A-501(2), -511(a)(1).

<sup>38</sup> Exceptions include capital cases, certain drug trafficking cases, certain fugitives, certain firearm offenses, certain gang-related offenses, parole violations, and certain probation violations. See Jessica Smith, *Criminal Proceedings Before North Carolina Magistrates* (UNC 2014) [hereinafter *Criminal Proceedings*], at pp. 27-34. Also, magistrates cannot set a bond in certain domestic violence cases at the initial appearance. *Id.* at p. 35. Those defendants must appear before a judge to have conditions set in 48 hours. *Id.* If a judge does not set conditions in 48 hours, the magistrate has the authority to do so. *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> G.S. 15A-534(a).

activity while on pretrial release, and rate of non-appearance in court. As a result, it is not possible to assess the extent to which the three goals of the pretrial release process – release, public safety, and court appearance – are being met in North Carolina.

It is, however, possible to look at the pretrial release practices that are used in the state, and compare them to legal and evidence-based practices. There are several areas of concern regarding the present process.

First, each judicial district has its own local pretrial release policy, and these policies mirror what is in the statute. However, many of these policies also include bond guidelines, which match the charge classification or the maximum penalty the defendant would face if convicted with a dollar secured bond amount or a range of amounts. Such policies make two assumptions, both of which legal and evidence-based practices show are false: (1) that the charge classification or maximum penalty defines the risks to public safety and court appearance that the defendant poses and (2) that money is the best way to address those risks. The pretrial risk assessment research shows that multiple factors, when considered together, provide the best models for predicting probability of success on pretrial release.<sup>40</sup> And, as noted earlier, research shows that, when controlling for risk levels, defendants who are not required to post a secured bond as a condition of pretrial release have the same public safety and court appearance rates as those who do, but without consuming the expensive jail bed resources used by many of those with secured bonds.<sup>41</sup>

Second, an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool is used currently in only one of the state's 100 counties – Mecklenburg County. As discussed in the next section, the use of an empirically-derived risk assessment is a critical component of legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices.

Third, only about 40 counties in the state are served by pretrial services entities, which supervise defendants on pretrial release.<sup>42</sup> Even in those counties where pretrial services exist, the statute specifies that the senior resident superior court judge may order that defendants can be released to the supervision of the program if both the defendant and the pretrial services program agree.<sup>43</sup> This approach undermines legal and evidence-based practices. If the empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool suggests that a particular defendant should be supervised on pretrial release, the judicial official should have the authority to order such supervision. Neither the defendant nor the pretrial services program should have the ability to, in effect, veto the judicial official's desired action. A potentially dangerous defendant should never be given the option of choosing whether to be supervised in the community or to buy his way out of jail with no supervision.

---

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument in Appendix A.

<sup>41</sup> *Unsecured Bonds*, *supra* note 16.

<sup>42</sup> According to a 2007 report, at that time there were 33 pretrial services programs operating within North Carolina, serving 40 of the state's 100 counties. *Pretrial Services Programs in North Carolina: A Process and Impact Assessment*, N.C. Governor's Crime Commission (2007), at 2.

<sup>43</sup> G.S. 15A-535(b).

Fourth, the law requires a formal process for bond review for felony defendants who remain incarcerated on a secured bond, but no such process is required for detained misdemeanor defendants. As a result, many misdemeanor defendants remain in jail for periods exceeding the sentence they could receive if convicted, and many plead guilty just so that they can be released. A new study of misdemeanor defendants from Harris County, Texas shows the serious consequences that can flow when holding misdemeanor defendants on secured bonds.<sup>44</sup> The study, which was conducted by the Rand Corporation and the University of Pennsylvania and which controlled for a wide range of other factors, found that, compared to their released counterparts, detained misdemeanor defendants were 25% more likely to plead guilty, and 43% more likely to be sentenced to jail, with jail sentences more than double of released defendants with a jail sentence. Researchers also found that, again controlling for other factors, detained misdemeanor defendants experienced a 30% increase in felony arrests within 18 months after completion of the case, and a 20% increase in misdemeanors, replicating the findings of research described earlier on the criminogenic effects of pretrial detention.<sup>45</sup> Based on these findings, researchers estimated that if Harris County had released on personal bond just those misdemeanor detainees who were held on bonds of \$500 or less “the county would have released 40,000 additional defendants pretrial, and these individuals would have avoided approximately 5,900 criminal convictions, many of which would have come through erroneous guilty pleas. Incarceration days in the county jail – severely overcrowded as of April 2016 – would have been reduced by at least 400,000. Over the next 18 months post release, these defendants would have committed 1,600 fewer felonies and 2,400 fewer misdemeanors.... Thus, with better pretrial detention policy, Harris County could save millions of dollars per year, increase public safety, and likely reduce wrongful convictions.”<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> Paul Heaton, Sandra G. Mayson, Megan Stevenson, *The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention* (July 14, 2016). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809840> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809840>.

<sup>45</sup> *Hidden Costs*, *supra* note 12.

<sup>46</sup> *Supra* note 44, at 45-46.

### III. LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL JUSTICE PRACTICES: MODELS FOR NORTH CAROLINA

This section describes the elements of a legal and evidence-based pretrial release system, and discusses how the implementation of these elements in North Carolina can bring the state’s pretrial justice practices into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

#### Risk assessment

For a number of reasons, having an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool is the keystone to a 21<sup>st</sup> century, legal and evidence-based pretrial release system. First, research demonstrates that such tools are highly effective in sorting defendants into categories showing their probabilities of success on pretrial release in terms of public safety and court appearance. The table below shows the results of the Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) in Denver, Colorado.<sup>47</sup> As the table shows, for both safety and appearance, the success rates fall as the risk levels rise. Using the CPAT when making a pretrial release decision, a judicial officer in Denver knows a defendant scoring as a Risk Level 1 has a 96% probability of completing the pretrial period without being charged with new criminal activity while on pretrial release, and a 95% probability of making all court appearances. There is nothing in the risk assessment approach currently used by most North Carolina counties – the bond guidelines – that can produce such quantitative information.

Risk Assessment Outcomes, Denver, Colorado

Risk Level	Safety Rate	Appearance Rate
1	96%	95%
2	93%	86%
3	86%	84%
4	80%	77%


Source: *The Colorado Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (CPAT)*, Pretrial Justice Institute and JFA Institute (2012)

Second, such tools can track any disparate impacts that might result through their use on racial and ethnic groups. If disparities do arise, they can be easily identified, which is the first step in addressing them. The chart below shows a breakdown by race and risk level of the Arnold Foundation’s PSA-Court risk assessment tool, the same tool being used currently in Mecklenburg County. In developing this tool, researchers ran statistical tests designed to identify disparities. As the chart shows, there has been very little variation in risk levels among African American versus white defendants using the PSA-Court tool.<sup>48</sup> The tool currently used in most North Carolina counties – the bond guidelines – provide no similar opportunity to test for any built-in biases of the tool, or to monitor for disparate outcomes. And, as noted above, data from North Carolina jails show that there are a large number of African Americans, disproportionate to their

<sup>47</sup> *The Colorado Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (CPAT)*, Pretrial Justice Institute and JFA Institute (2012).

<sup>48</sup> *Results of the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Kentucky*, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2014), at 4.

population in the community, who are in jail pretrial.<sup>49</sup> With an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool – one that has been tested for disparities – North Carolina officials would be able to contextualize the race data presented earlier and begin to address any identified issues.



Source: *Results of the First Six Months of the Public Safety Assessment – Court in Kentucky*, Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2014).


Third, having an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool allows a jurisdiction to make valid comparisons between different types of release, or specific conditions of release. For example, as noted earlier, the for-profit bail bonding industry touts studies showing that defendants released through commercial bonds have higher appearance rates than defendants released through other means. But without knowing the risk levels of defendants it is not possible to know whether defendants in one group are comparable, in terms of risk, to defendants in another group. Such comparisons cannot presently be made in most North Carolina jurisdictions, but they can be made in jurisdictions that have implemented empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment.

Fourth, knowing the risk levels of defendants who are in jail helps a jurisdiction assess whether it is using its expensive jail resources for those who need to be there because of their risks. The data presented in Section II from the six North Carolina counties shows the charges of those who were in jail during the day the snapshot was taken, but since their risk level was unknown, it is very difficult to assess whether this was a good use of jail space.<sup>50</sup> When Mesa County, Colorado officials first implemented the Colorado risk assessment tool, they leaped at the opportunity to look at the risk

<sup>49</sup> *Supra* pp. 15-16.

<sup>50</sup> Once Mecklenburg County began using an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool, it was possible to see how jail space was being used in that jurisdiction. See: <http://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Final-Presentation-raleigh-1.pdf>, Slides 11 & 12.

levels of the pretrial defendants they were holding, and they found that there were high percentages of low risk defendants in jail. County officials have been using the risk assessment levels to track progress in addressing that situation. As the chart below shows, officials can now report to their community how they are using the jail for the pretrial population – 80% of the pretrial detainees are scored in the two highest risk categories. Before implementing the risk assessment tool, county officials were in the same position as North Carolina officials – they could only point to data showing that there were large numbers of persons in jail pretrial on low level offenses or low bonds – without any knowledge of their risk levels.



Source: Data provided by Mesa County, Colorado.

Fifth, knowing the risk levels of defendants coming through the system can help officials plan for, and justify to taxpayers, the resources needed to address the risks. Numerous pretrial risk assessment studies have demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of defendants fall into low or medium risk categories, meaning that they should require minimal resources for monitoring in the community. Knowing risk levels can help budget officers better project funding needs.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>51</sup> An analysis of costs in the federal system found that detaining a defendant pretrial costed an average of \$19,000 per defendant, while the costs for supervising a defendant in the community ranged from \$3,100 to \$4,600 per defendant. The analysis took into consideration the costs of supervision, any treatment, and any costs associated with law enforcement returning defendants who had failed to appear for court. Marie VanNostrand and Gina Keebler, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court*, 73 FED. PROB., (2009), at 6.

Recognizing these benefits, at least seven states – Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia – have passed laws requiring the use of statewide empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tools.<sup>52</sup>

The Arnold Foundation’s PSA-Court tool offers several benefits for use in North Carolina. First, it is presently being used in Mecklenburg County, so there is in-state experience with the tool, giving judges, prosecutors and defenders from around the state the opportunity to speak with their counterparts in Mecklenburg County about their experience working with the tool.

Second, the PSA–Court tool has been validated using data from 1.5 million cases from over 300 local, state and federal jurisdictions all across the country, meaning that it is the most universal pretrial risk assessment tool in existence. Currently 29 jurisdictions, including three states – Arizona, Kentucky and New Jersey – use the tool.<sup>53</sup> This should give North Carolina officials confidence that it will perform well in North Carolina.

Third, the risk assessment can be completed using information typically available at the time of the initial appearance before the magistrate.<sup>54</sup> It does not require an interview with the defendant by a pretrial services program or other entity. This is important given that most North Carolina counties, even those that have pretrial services programs, do not presently have the capacity to interview defendants prior to the initial appearance before the magistrate.

As a result, this report recommends that officials explore implementing Arnold’s PSA-Court tool in jurisdictions throughout North Carolina.<sup>55</sup> Since the tool is not yet publicly available and a timeline for its availability is uncertain, as a backup this report recommends that North Carolina use the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment instrument (VPRAI). The VPRAI was first developed in Virginia in 2003 after a study of data from seven diverse jurisdictions throughout the state.<sup>56</sup> It was re-validated in 2009 from nine diverse Virginia jurisdictions.<sup>57</sup> A copy of the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment instrument is in Appendix A.

---

<sup>52</sup> Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-4-106, 4(c); 11 Del. C. §2104(d), §2105; Haw. Rev. Stat. §353-10; Ky. Rev. Ann. §431.066; 446.010(35); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:162-16; §2A-162-17; Va. Code Ann. §19.2-152.3; W. Va. Code Ann. §62-11F-1 et seq.

<sup>53</sup> See:

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwig1YDn5I7OAhUFOyYKHaxYB4cQFgglMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.arnoldfoundation.org%2Finitiative%2Fcriminal-justice%2Fcrime-prevention%2Fpublic-safety-assessment%2F&usq=AFQjCNE6Iwbltg8uh1AFDgmYPbfcgXjgXA>.

<sup>54</sup> In Mecklenburg County, however, the tool has been implemented only for use by the district court judge.

<sup>55</sup> See Section V, Recommendations. The factors included in this tool are listed in Appendix E.

<sup>56</sup> Marie VanNostrand, *Assessing Risk Among Pretrial Defendants in Virginia: The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument*, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2003.

<sup>57</sup> Marie VanNostrand and Kenneth Rose, *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Virginia*, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, 2009.

## Release/Detention Matrix

Once the risk assessment is completed on a defendant, the next step is to determine how to use that information to make a release/detention decision. Research is providing guidance on how to do that, matching identified risk levels with appropriate risk management strategies. For example, defendants who are found to be low risk have very high rates of success on pretrial release. Research has shown that these already high rates cannot be improved by imposing restrictive conditions of release on low risk defendants.<sup>58</sup> The research shows that the only result to expect when imposing restrictive conditions of release on low risk defendants is an increase in technical violations.<sup>59</sup> Instead, the most appropriate response is to release these low risk defendants on personal bonds with no specific conditions, and no supervision other than to receive a reminder notice of their court dates.<sup>60</sup>

Other studies have found that high risk defendants who are released with supervision have higher rates of success on pretrial release than similarly-situated unsupervised defendants. For example, one study found that, when controlling for other factors, high risk defendants who were released with supervision were 33% less likely to fail to appear in court than their unsupervised counterparts.<sup>61</sup>

A reality that any jurisdiction faces is that, even though the charge or type of charge may provide little information on a defendant's risk to public safety or to fail to appear in court, the impact of new criminal activity or failing to appear on the more serious charge is perceived to be much greater. Therefore, many jurisdictions that use empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tools have developed matrices that combine the risk level with charge types, for example, non-violent misdemeanor, violent misdemeanor, non-violent felony, and violent felony. The resulting intersection of the risk level and charge type produces a suggested release/detention decision. The decision itself remains within the discretion of the judge or magistrate after considering the risk assessment, the matrix, and any other relevant factors.

A copy of the matrix used in Virginia, based on the VPRAI, is in Appendix B. If North Carolina adopts the VPRAI, this matrix, called the Pretrial Praxis, should be used in concert with the VPRAI.

## Risk Management

Any conditions set on a defendant's pretrial release should be related to the risk identified for that individual defendant and should be the least restrictive necessary to reasonably assure the safety of the public and appearance in court.<sup>62</sup> The research on

---

<sup>58</sup> *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Federal Court*, *supra* note 46.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*

<sup>60</sup> *Id.*

<sup>61</sup> Christopher Lowenkamp and Marie VanNostrand, *Exploring the Impact of Supervision on Pretrial Outcomes*. (New York: Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2013.)

<sup>62</sup> *American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.) Pretrial Release* (2007) Std. 10-5.2 (a) at 106-107.

risk management is not as advanced as it is on risk assessment. With the current state of research, it is not possible to identify which conditions of release work best for all defendants. But there is some research to guide policy makers.

As noted above, research has shown that putting conditions of non-financial release on low risk defendants actually increases their likelihood of failure on pretrial release. Rather, the most appropriate response is to release these low risk defendants on personal recognizance with no specific conditions.<sup>63</sup>

Several studies have shown that simply reminding defendants of their upcoming court dates can have a dramatic impact on reducing the likelihood of failure to appear. One study found that calling and speaking with defendants to remind them about their court dates cut the failure to appear rate from 21% to 8%.<sup>64</sup> Another study tested the impact of a pilot court date reminder project that using an automated telephone dialing system to contact defendants. The study found that the project led to a 31% drop in the failure to appear rate and an annual cost saving of \$1.55 million.<sup>65</sup>

Two studies that have considered the defendant's risk level, as determined by an empirically-derived risk assessment tool, have found that supervision results in lower rates of failure to appear and new criminal activity when compared to their risk-level counterparts who received no supervision.<sup>66</sup>

The Virginia Pretrial Praxis<sup>67</sup> takes all of this research into consideration, incorporating different options for managing any identified risks. These include release on personal recognizance or unsecured bonds with no conditions of release other than to receive a court date reminder, followed by release on gradually increasing levels of supervision based on identified risks.<sup>68</sup>

## Citations

The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice (Pretrial Release) state that "[i]t should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent consistent with the effective

---

<sup>63</sup> *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Federal Court*, *supra* note 54.

<sup>64</sup> Jefferson County, *Colorado Court Date Notification Program: FTA Pilot Project Summary* (2005).

<sup>65</sup> Matt O'Keefe, *Court Appearance Notification System: 2007 Analysis Highlights* (2007). See also: Michael N. Herian and Brian H. Bernstein, *Reducing Failure to Appear in Nebraska: A Field Study*, THE NEBRASKA LAWYER (2010); and Wendy White, *Court Hearing Call Notification Project*, Coconino County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (2006).

<sup>66</sup> John S. Goldkamp and Michael D. White, *Restoring Accountability in Pretrial Release: The Philadelphia Pretrial Release Supervision Experiments*, JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY, 2(2) (2006), at 143-181; Christopher Lowenkamp Marie VanNostrand, *Exploring the Impact of Supervision on Pretrial Outcomes*. Laura and John Arnold Foundation (2013).

<sup>67</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>68</sup> See Appendix C.

enforcement of the law. This policy should be implemented by statutes of statewide applicability.”<sup>69</sup>

At least one state has changed its laws recently, expanding the use of citation releases. In 2012, Maryland enacted legislation mandating that law enforcement officers issue a citation in lieu of custodial arrest when the officer has grounds to make a warrantless arrest for persons facing misdemeanor or ordinance offenses that carry a maximum penalty of 90 days or less, and for possession of marijuana. The law allows the law enforcement officer to fingerprint and photograph the individual before the citation release. In the year after the law went into effect, there was an 80% increase in the number of citations issued in the state and nearly 20,000 fewer initial appearances in court. “From a cost perspective, the further expansion of criminal citations has the potential to save money by reducing arrests and booking costs.”<sup>70</sup>

### *Prosecutor involvement at the initial hearing*

Ideally, prosecutors should review criminal charges immediately after arrest, prior to the initial bail hearing before a judicial officer, to weed out those cases not likely to advance. Many cases are dropped after review by prosecutors – one study found that 25% of all felony cases are ultimately dropped.<sup>71</sup> Experienced prosecutors, those who have extensive trial experience and who know what is needed to get a conviction, are best equipped to do a review of cases before the initial appearance than less experienced prosecutors. The District of Columbia prosecutor’s office has been doing this for many years. In 2012, of the 27,000 cases brought to the office by law enforcement, 8,000 were declined before the initial appearance before a judicial officer – thus stopping at the front door of the courts about 30% of all new arrests, cases that would have needlessly bogged down the system.<sup>72</sup>

In addition to screening cases early, prosecutors should be present at the initial appearance of the defendant before the magistrate. At the hearing, the prosecutor should make appropriate representations on behalf of the state on the issue of pretrial release. As the National District Attorneys Association standards state, at that hearing “[p]rosecutors should recommend bail decisions that facilitate pretrial release rather than detention.”<sup>73</sup>

In North Carolina, prosecutors are not routinely present at the initial appearance before the magistrate.

### *Defense representation*

---

<sup>69</sup> *American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.) Pretrial Release* (2007) Std. 10-2.1, at 63.

<sup>70</sup> *Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System: Final Report* (2014), at 27-28.

<sup>71</sup> Reaves, *supra* note 11, at 24

<sup>72</sup> *The United States Attorneys Office for the District of Columbia: 2012 Annual Report* (2013) at 31.

<sup>73</sup> *National Prosecution Standards: 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*, National District Attorneys Association, 2009, Std 4-1.1.

The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of the adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”<sup>74</sup> The Court stopped short of saying that an attorney must be present at the hearing, only that the right to counsel attaches at that time.

The American Council of Chief Defenders, however, calls on all public defender offices to “dedicate sufficient resources to the bail hearing and/or first appearance, where the pretrial release terms are set.” At that hearing, public defenders should “obtain and use crucial risk assessment information for making relevant and persuasive arguments regarding appropriate release conditions for their clients.”<sup>75</sup> Research has shown that indigent defendants who are represented by counsel at the bail hearing are released non-financially at about 2½ times the rate of those who were unrepresented.<sup>76</sup>

Defense attorneys do not presently represent indigent defendants at the initial appearance before the magistrate in North Carolina. In many North Carolina jurisdictions, the defendant first receives counsel at the first appearance in District Court.

### *Bond review of defendants unable to post bond*

As noted in Section II, current North Carolina law requires a first appearance (which includes a review of pretrial conditions) before a district court judge for in-custody defendants charged with a felony. However, no such hearing is required for in-custody defendants charged with misdemeanors. This can, and often does, result in misdemeanor defendants remaining in pretrial confinement for periods longer than they might serve as a sentence if convicted. This “gap” in the law seems to be unique to North Carolina. In other states, a defendant who remains in custody after an initial hearing before a magistrate will appear before a judge the next court business day for a bond review hearing, regardless of the charge level.

### *Data/performance measures*

Collecting data on the impact and outcomes of evidence-based practices is crucial for 21<sup>st</sup> Century pretrial justice. Jurisdictions should be able to report on data on all criminal cases relating the three goals of the bail decision:

- Public safety rate (defendants not arrested for new criminal activity while on pretrial release) for all released defendants, broken down risk level and by release type.

---

<sup>74</sup> *Rothgery v. Gillespie*, 554 U.S. 191 (2008), at 20.

<sup>75</sup> American Council of Chief Defenders, *Policy Statement on Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice Practices* (2011), at 14.

<sup>76</sup> Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster and Shawn Bushway, *Do Attorneys Really Matter? The empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail*, *CARDOZO LAW REVIEW*, 23 (2002) at 1719-1793.

- Court appearance rate for all released defendants (percentage of defendants who did not fail to appear for all scheduled hearings, resulting in the issuance of a warrant or order for arrest), broken down by risk level and by release type.
- Pretrial release rate, broken down by risk level, release type, and time between arrest and release.

Other important measures include:

- Number of defendants released by citation, broken down by charge and by police department and/or sheriff's office.
- Percent of defendants for whom an actuarial risk assessment was scored prior to the release-or-detain decision by the magistrate, broken down by county or judicial district.
- Percent of cases reviewed by an experienced prosecutor prior to the initial appearance before a magistrate, broken down by county or judicial district.
- Percent of initial appearances before the magistrate in which the prosecution and defense participate, broken down by county or judicial district.
- Percent of cases in which the magistrate's decision matches that suggestion of the pretrial matrix, broken down by county and by magistrate.
- Percent of detained defendants who were detained as a result of a detention hearing, broken down by county or judicial district.
- Percent of detained defendants who were held on a secured bond, broken down by risk level and by county or other appropriate jurisdiction.
- Length of stay in jail for detained defendants who were held on a secured bond, broken down by risk level, bond amount, and county or other appropriate jurisdiction.

## IV. PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE LEGAL STRUCTURE

### *Prerequisites to Understanding the Legal Analysis*

Understanding any legal analysis designed to guide decision makers toward implementing legal and evidence-based practices requires first knowing three broad concepts. First, every jurisdiction in America already has many essential elements of a pretrial system, even if that system does not function optimally. For example, each jurisdiction does a version of risk assessment. In some jurisdictions, however, risk assessment is done simply by glancing at a defendant's top charge. Other jurisdictions use empirically-derived risk assessment instruments, validated to their populations, which help predict the chances of a defendant's pretrial misbehavior. Likewise, all jurisdictions do some sort of risk management, from merely hoping that a defendant will come back to court and stay out of trouble during the pretrial phase to using dedicated professional pretrial services agencies designed to further the lawful purposes of release and detention. In the same way, every state has a legal structure to effectuate pretrial release and detention that works at some level. Nevertheless, sometimes that structure can actually hinder what we know today are "best-practices" in pretrial release and detention. Understanding this allows us to acknowledge that "bail reform" is not necessarily a daunting task; indeed, it often means merely improving existing systems, even if those improvements are comprehensive.

Second, we are learning that a great deal of education is necessary to fully understand what those improvements should be. Pretrial release and detention is deceptively complex, and yet suffers from decades of neglect in our colleges, universities, and law schools. It is simply not enough to take on a topic like pretrial release and detention with the traditional and existing knowledge of criminal justice stakeholders. Some specialized education must take place. Fortunately, to help jurisdictions obtain the knowledge necessary to advance pretrial justice, there are numerous documents and programs available today through the Pretrial Justice Institute and other leading organizations that can provide education, advice, and assistance. Even though decision-makers in particular jurisdictions may believe that they lack data and information, in this generation of bail reform we have virtually every answer to the significant questions that have nagged America over the past 100 years – answers that can lead to substantial progress toward pretrial justice. Due to time and space limitations given for this report, it will be up to North Carolina criminal justice leaders to read beyond this report to fully learn the additional material that points to those answers.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> North Carolina stakeholders should begin by reading *Fundamentals of Bail*, *supra* note 1, and Timothy R. Schnacke, *Money as a Criminal Justice Stakeholder: The Judge's Decision to Release or Detain a Defendant Pretrial*, Nat'l Inst. Corr. (2014), and references cited therein. By doing so, stakeholders will learn that broad reports (such as this one) concerning the state of pretrial release and detention in any particular state can often only provide the impetus for continued conversations over legal and evidence-based practices based on research, which, in turn, is being published at an increasingly rapid pace.

Third, the knowledge gained from deep bail education often illustrates that certain assumptions underlying a state's existing release and detention laws, policies, and practices are flawed, and that the solutions to perceived issues at bail are counterintuitive in our current culture. For example, for over 100 years, courts in America have assumed that defendants pose higher pretrial risks when facing higher charges, and our laws and practices are set up to effectuate release based on that assumption. However, the pretrial research is demonstrating that certain misdemeanor defendants often pose higher risk than felony defendants and that many felony defendants pose little risk at all. Likewise, jurisdictions often assume that money helps to keep citizens safe, but the research, the history, and the law all tell us that this is not so. Understanding the somewhat counterintuitive nature of certain pretrial justice change efforts helps us to understand and possibly change the current culture surrounding pretrial release and detention.

### *The History of Bail and the Fundamental Legal Principles*

Understanding any legal analysis also requires having at least some familiarity with the history of bail (release) and no bail (detention) – considered to be a “fundamental” or “core” element that jurisdictions must understand to make improvements in pretrial justice. Generally speaking, the history of bail shows that in roughly 1900, America moved from a system of pretrial release using personal sureties administering unsecured bonds to a system relying on commercial sureties administering mostly secured bonds. Justice system professionals and researchers in America very quickly learned that the infusion of profit, indemnification, and security into bail led to continued and, indeed, increased unnecessary detention of bailable defendants,<sup>78</sup> but not before states had already adopted the “charge-and-secured money” legal systems we still see today.

At the time, many courts in America believed that using commercial sureties and secured bonds would help get most defendants out of jail pretrial, but it only made things worse. Today, after two generations of bail reform in America designed to fix the problems with the charge-and-secured money release system, we find ourselves in yet another generation of reform hoping to fix it once again because secured money bonds continue to interfere with rational release and detention.

Moreover, understanding any legal analysis requires knowing how the fundamental legal principles underlying American pretrial release and detention have been molded by history and have, in many ways and until very recently, failed in fixing the problems brought on by the changes in 1900. Knowing the law for bail and no bail means knowing that the law has been largely ignored for decades, allowing states to craft legal schemes that are now being successfully challenged in the courts. Generally speaking, many state bail laws are simply unlawful when measured against the larger American legal principles, such as procedural due process and equal protection, and this

---

<sup>78</sup> See, e.g., Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter (Eds.), *Criminal Justice in Cleveland* (Cleveland Found. 1922); Arthur L. Beeley, *The Bail System in Chicago*, at 160 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1927).

alone is causing many states to make substantial changes to those laws to allow for legal and evidence-based practices in pretrial release and detention.<sup>79</sup>

### Current North Carolina Legal Structure

Unlike many states, North Carolina has a detailed recitation of existing laws, and that recitation has served as a useful tool for the instant report.<sup>80</sup> This analysis seeks to go beyond that recitation to assess whether the legal structure helps or hinders best pretrial practices. Due to time limits, this overview of the North Carolina legal structure must be viewed only as the beginning of a conversation about holding up the state's laws to the broader legal principles, the history of bail, the pretrial research, and the national standards on best practices to assess every element affecting pretrial justice. Pretrial reform often involves making improvements to *all* decisions and practices from the initial police stop to sentencing. Reviewing those decisions and practices, looking at the associated legal and evidence-based literature for each, holding them up to some model and to existing laws while comparing those laws to other sources, and making recommendations for possible changes, while fruitful, would be laborious and lead to an overwhelmingly lengthy document. Accordingly, this report will examine in detail only the most crucial issues facing North Carolina at this time, which mostly deal with the judicial official's decision to release or detain a defendant pretrial.<sup>81</sup>

Nevertheless, the people of North Carolina should see the benefits of looking at other decision points or practices in the process. For example, a crucial element in pretrial justice is diversion, and while the author saw references to a variety of local diversion programs, such as "jail diversion," mental health courts, and public and private diversion for certain first offenders in North Carolina, other state's statutes provide many more opportunities for structured pretrial diversion, and base those programs on their own literatures concerning best practices. Likewise, even though there did not appear to be anything legally hindering defense counsel providing assistance at initial appearances, this does not appear to be the practice in North Carolina even though at the initial appearance defendants are facing significant deprivations of liberty.<sup>82</sup> By briefly reviewing the North Carolina laws, the author also saw potential issues concerning: (1) police issuing citations versus arresting persons and courts issuing summonses versus warrants for arrests (laws can be amended to encourage or even require the use of citations and summonses so that arrest is only

---

<sup>79</sup> As only one example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently struck down as unconstitutional an Arizona "no bail" provision enacted in its constitution. See *Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio*, 770 F.3d 772 (2014). Until very recently, people have mistakenly inferred the lawfulness of certain bail practices due simply to the lack of opinions expressly declaring them to be unlawful.

<sup>80</sup> See *Criminal Proceedings*, *supra* note 37.

<sup>81</sup> A more detailed legal analysis would also look deeply into North Carolina case law, which was not done for purposes of this report.

<sup>82</sup> Defense counsel at the initial appearance has spun off into its own reform effort, with multiple groups working on the issue simultaneously. Reasons for including defense counsel at initial appearance include empirical evidence in addition to fairness. See *Early Appointment of Counsel: The Law, Implementation, and Benefits* (Sixth Amend. Ctr./PJI 2014); *Do Attorneys Really Matter?*, *supra* note 70.

reserved as a last resort):<sup>83</sup> (2) practices such as requiring fingerprinting and DNA testing that might lead to unnecessary arrests; (3) the potentially inefficient practice surrounding the use of appearance bonds for infractions; (4) certain laws that allow for delays in holding the initial appearance (such as tasks required of officers arresting defendants on implied consent offenses) or that hinder the immediate release of low and medium defendants present at that appearance (the pretrial research, which follows the law, would point to dealing with the vast majority of defendants rapidly, and especially low and medium risk defendants because keeping those defendants unnecessarily detained can actually lead to more crime and failures to appear for court); (5) speedy trial for detained defendants; (6) potential problems with implementing risk assessment into a legal scheme already containing various untested risk factors that judicial officials “must” consider;<sup>84</sup> and (7) collecting data and performance measures (data collection is crucial to understanding the efficacy of any pretrial system, and many states are now enacting requirements for such things into their laws).

Moreover, when considering changes to the release and detention decision, most jurisdictions recognize that empirically-derived risk assessment and evidence-based risk management are crucial elements, if not prerequisites, to those changes. Only by knowing defendants’ risk can courts follow the law and the evidence by immediately releasing the majority of pretrial defendants under varying levels of research-supported supervision to both protect the public and bring people back to court, while providing for extreme public safety risk management through the ability to detain certain defendants in a fair and transparent procedure. The laws must allow for these elements, and if they do not, they must be changed.

The largest issue facing North Carolina, however, deals with the laws surrounding the judicial official’s decision to release or detain a defendant pretrial. North Carolina currently has a legal scheme with elements based firmly in a charge-and-secured money bond system and with somewhat faulty assumptions about both money and charge.

To assess North Carolina’s laws for how it deals with the release and detention decision, this section examines the following: (1) how the North Carolina laws operate broadly as compared to other states, focusing primarily on its statutory release/detention eligibility framework; (2) certain assumptions that seem to buttress

---

<sup>83</sup> Current North Carolina law appears to allow an officer to issue a citation for a misdemeanor or infraction, but there is no preference or mandatory language. G.S. § 15A-302. The law concerning summonses apparently allows the issuance of a summons for felonies in addition to misdemeanors and infractions (also with no preference), but because the AOC criminal summons form has been drafted not to charge a felony, persons have apparently been advised not to issue one for felonies. *See id.* §15A-303(a); *Criminal Proceedings, supra* note 37, at 4. Other jurisdictions have shown that requiring the arrest of felony defendants is not always necessary, and the trend across America appears to be the use of mechanisms that gradually ratchet up criminal process and that incorporate every means possible to compel court appearance before resorting to arrest. To the extent that warrants (or OFA’s in North Carolina) use financial conditions of release on their face, that practice should be made part of any discussion to reduce or eliminate secured financial conditions generally. To the extent that North Carolina can discuss the appropriate use of arrests for violations of release conditions, it should do so also. Finally, to the extent that North Carolina can adopt the evidence-based practice of court date notification in all of its courts, it should do so.

<sup>84</sup> *See* G.S. § 15A-534(c).

existing laws and that might make change difficult; (3) provisions setting out the detention process; (4) provisions setting out the release process; and (5) issues gleaned from a reading of various local pretrial release policies.

### *North Carolina Laws: The Right to Release and Authority to Preventively Detain High Risk Defendants Generally*

Current North Carolina law does not expressly provide for a right to actual pretrial release or articulate a procedure for preventive detention of high risk defendants. As discussed below, both omissions create barriers to pretrial reform.

North Carolina eliminated the right to bail provision in its constitution of 1868.<sup>85</sup> North Carolina is thus like eight other states and the federal system, all of which operate without a constitutional right to bail, which means that certain changes to the system of release and detention will not be hindered by constitutional right to bail hurdles.<sup>86</sup> From a legal standpoint, states with no constitutional right to bail can more easily implement both release and detention provisions that follow legal and evidence-based practices than states with such a constitutional right.

This is not to say that North Carolina does not have a right to release pretrial, and, indeed, there are good arguments for why a state could never completely eliminate any right to pretrial release. But in North Carolina, it appears that the right is somewhat confused. Unlike in other states' laws, there is no explicit delineation of precisely who should actually be released or detained. Although Section 15A-533 is entitled, "Right to pretrial release in capital and noncapital cases,"<sup>87</sup> the body of the statute is crafted only in terms of setting or not setting conditions. Various local pretrial release policies quote cases articulating a right to pretrial release,<sup>88</sup> and even interpreting § 15A-533 to provide for a "right to release,"<sup>89</sup> but while the statute's title speaks of a right to release, the statute both generally and specifically points only to a "right to have one's conditions set," which is far from actual release.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> The previous constitution stated: "All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident, or the presumption great." N.C. Const. art. 39 (1776).

<sup>86</sup> Of course, as in other states, North Carolina has other constitutional provisions that are relevant to bail, and that will form the boundaries over potential reforms. For example, some states have issues with constitutional victim's rights provisions when those provisions require a victim's presence at initial appearance, thus causing delay. The relevant North Carolina provision articulates a "right as prescribed by law [for victims] to present their views and concerns to the Governor or agency considering any action that could result in the release of the accused, prior to such action becoming effective." N.C. Const. art 1, § 37(1)(g). Because this provision speaks of the "accused," it has clear implications for pretrial release; nevertheless, the right appears to hinge on how it is "prescribed by law," and in the time allotted for this analysis, the author was unable to find any statutory provision that might delay or hinder the release or detention decision.

<sup>87</sup> G.S. § 15A-533.

<sup>88</sup> See, e.g., *In the Matter of Promulgating Local Rules Relating to Bail and Pretrial Release for Judicial District 8A*, at 5-6 (quoting *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)).

<sup>89</sup> See, e.g., *Policies Relating to Bail and Pre-Trial Release Second Judicial District*, at 2.

<sup>90</sup> G.S. §§ 15A-533(b) (stating that "[a] defendant charged with a noncapital offense must have conditions or pretrial release determined"). The relevant treatise also speaks only of a right to have conditions set,

Moreover, the statute has no discernable process for detention of the sort approved in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in *United States v. Salerno*,<sup>91</sup> which guides states in crafting such provisions. Existing North Carolina law creates rebuttable presumptions that “no conditions or combination of conditions” will provide reasonable assurance of public safety and court appearance for defendants charged with certain offenses with certain preconditions,<sup>92</sup> but those provisions only testify to the notion that other cases, even without the presumptions, are potentially cases in which “no condition or combination of conditions” would suffice; obviously, presumptions toward a certain result in some cases means that there should be a broader set of cases allowing the presumptive subset to exist, yet the statute has no provisions to deal with them. There are simply no statutory provisions setting forth exactly what to do in a typical case where a defendant is deemed extremely high risk and unmanageable outside of secure detention and falls outside of the rebuttable presumption cases.

As discussed below, a right merely to have conditions set, coupled with the statutory provisions discussing those conditions as well as no decent process for risk-based detention, naturally moves North Carolina judicial officials toward using secured money conditions to address risk for both court appearance and public safety, and toward attempting to use unattainable money conditions to detain defendants posing extremely high pretrial risk. By contrast, “model” release and detention schemes would expressly articulate who is releasable, who potentially is not, and provide mechanisms to make sure that the in-or-out decision is made purposefully, transparently, and fairly, and with nothing (such as money) interfering with the decision.<sup>93</sup>

In addition to not being entirely clear on what right North Carolina defendants actually enjoy as well as not providing for a due-process laden detention process, North Carolina law overall illustrates the same issues facing virtually every other state in America: the legal scheme is based on a charge and secured-money model, and this core issue can hinder attempts to improve the system without statutory changes. Specifically, although the statute speaks of pretrial risk (something other state statutes often do not do), it makes determinations of who is entitled to having release conditions set based primarily on charge as a proxy for risk, and subtly points judicial officials toward using

---

and provides as exceptions those cases in which defendants don’t enjoy a right to have conditions set. *Criminal Proceedings*, *supra* note 74, at 27.

<sup>91</sup> To pass constitutional muster, a preventive detention provision would have to comply with the requirements discussed in *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (finding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 constitutional against facial due process and excessive bail claims).

<sup>92</sup> *See, e.g.*, G.S. § 15A-533(d) (rebuttable presumption for persons accused of drug trafficking). These provisions are also fairly limited, requiring judicial officers in most cases to find facts concerning the offense as well as certain preconditions such as already being on pretrial release at the time of the current offense along with some delineated previous conviction. *See generally Criminal Proceedings*, *supra* note 74, at 27-30.

<sup>93</sup> There are few exemplary statutes that currently do this. However, the D.C. bail statute, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-1301-09, 1321-33, which reflects principles articulated in the American Bar Association Standards on Pretrial Release, has been used by many jurisdictions as a model to begin conversations about statutory reform.

the money condition to address risk.<sup>94</sup> The better practice would be to set forth a right to release for all except extremely high risk defendants (or defendants who are not as risky but who also face extremely serious charges, or both), provide for a lawful and transparent detention provision based on risk to allow pretrial detention with no conditions, and then create mechanisms so that persons released pretrial are released immediately. Rebuttable presumptions, though perhaps not made entirely unnecessary by the move toward infusing risk into charge-based systems, can be crafted to use both risk and charge in ways that support the law and the research.

### *North Carolina Law: Underlying Assumptions*

Many jurisdictions have learned that overcoming flawed assumptions concerning pretrial release and detention is necessary before making improvements to the process. In addition to the flawed assumption that the right to bail is merely a right to have one's conditions set, or the equally flawed assumption that higher charge necessarily equals higher risk, there are two additional significant assumptions that should be addressed. These assumptions are not unique to North Carolina; indeed, they are seen across the country and illustrate a much more pressing problem with bail reform in America, which is that many pretrial improvements involve thinking about release and detention in an entirely different way. This means that bail reform involves "adaptive change," which involves overcoming faulty assumptions driving the way we think about any particular topic.<sup>95</sup>

One assumption found throughout the North Carolina laws appears to be that money at bail affects public safety. It is found either explicitly, as in G.S. §15A-534(d2)(1), which requires judicial officials to impose a secured bond or house arrest (which includes a secured bond) "[i]f the judicial official determines that the defendant poses a danger to the public," or implicitly, as in G.S. § 15A-534(d3), which allows a judicial official to double the amount of money condition for defendants who commit crimes while on pretrial release, presumably to better protect the public from future crimes. Money does not protect the public, however, unless it is used unlawfully to detain an otherwise releasable defendant.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> For example, although the statute includes an express presumption for non-secured releases, G.S. § 15A-534 (b), later provisions do not mandate and also place significant limitations on pretrial services supervision, which might lead judicial officials to set more secured bonds. Likewise, various provisions throughout the statute equating secured money amounts with public safety might nudge any particular judicial official toward setting a secured bond since a finding of "a danger of injury to any person" is one reason for overcoming the presumption of non-secured release. The fact that the statute requires judicial officials to set conditions for high risk defendants falling outside of the "no conditions" exceptions, also necessarily moves those officials toward using secured money bonds to at least respond to extremely high risk.

<sup>95</sup> Bail reform has only recently begun to understand that the improvements involved require system changes as well as changes in people's beliefs and core understandings of certain concepts. For information on how adaptive change can be addressed at bail, go to <http://transformingcorrections.com/about/>.

<sup>96</sup> Using money to detain defendants pretrial would obviously implicate a state's right to bail or release provision, but the practice can also lead to claims concerning both substantive and procedural due process, equal protection, and excessive bail.

In many states, using money to protect the public is expressly unlawful, but even in a state like North Carolina, it is irrational and thus implicitly unlawful. North Carolina G.S. § 15A-544.3 makes failure to appear for court the only event that can lead to forfeiture of money on a bail bond. Thus, when a defendant commits a new crime while on pretrial release, the money is not forfeited. Accordingly, it is irrational to set money to motivate defendant behavior concerning criminal activity because the money cannot lawfully act as a motivator. Setting a condition of release that cannot lawfully do what one intends it to do is irrational, and thus likely unlawful based on any legal theory that requires courts to use rationality or reason in its actions.<sup>97</sup> Likewise, no research has ever shown money to protect the public. In fact, the research on secured money bail shows that setting secured bonds leading to the detention of low and medium risk defendants actually causes them to become *higher* risk for both new criminal activity and failure to appear for court.<sup>98</sup> Setting a condition of release that leads to the *opposite* of what a court intends is even more irrational than setting one that simply doesn't work.

Finally, no matter how high the amount, any particular extremely dangerous defendant might still be able to pay it, leading to the potential for some horrific yet avoidable crime during the pretrial period. This public safety problem is exacerbated by North Carolina law, which appears to limit a judicial officer's ability to set a "cash only" bond.<sup>99</sup> Because commercial sureties cannot lose money due to new criminal activity, in many states those sureties help extremely high risk defendants obtain easy release by using no-money-down and payment plan options.

Another assumption found in North Carolina law (including the local pretrial release policies) that potentially hinders the adoption of legal and evidence-based practices appears to be an assumption that release to pretrial services agency supervision should be reserved only for low level crimes or low risk defendants.<sup>100</sup> In fact, the use of pretrial services functions are part of a high functioning pretrial system, and such agencies are often best when overseeing defendants posing high risk or charged with more serious crimes.

---

<sup>97</sup> For example, even using its lowest level of scrutiny, due process analysis requires the means of government action to be rationally related to some legitimate end. There should be no doubt that all government action must be rational and non-arbitrary.

<sup>98</sup> See, e.g., *Hidden Costs*, *supra* note 12.

<sup>99</sup> See *Criminal Proceedings*, *supra* note 37, at 39.

<sup>100</sup> See G.S. § 15A-535(b) (allowing, but not requiring pretrial services programs, requiring defendant consent before they are used, and allowing them only in lieu of release under condition options (1), (2), or (3) of G.S. §15A-434(a). Apparently, very few North Carolina judicial districts have pretrial services agency programs, and at least one that does puts a wide variety of further restrictions on using them, including a long list of exclusionary criteria and excluded offenses that most people would describe as "serious." See *Bail Policy for Twenty Sixth Judicial District* at 5, 23-33. Together, these factors suggest an assumption that pretrial services supervision is only inappropriate for certain low level crimes or low risk defendants. This assumption is often tied to the first concerning money and public safety; jurisdictions that believe money is the best way to manage pretrial risk often believe that pretrial services supervision should be reserved only for those cases in which money is unnecessary.

## North Carolina Law: Preventive Detention of High Risk Defendants

As noted above, North Carolina law does not expressly establish a procedure for the preventive detention of high risk defendants. Moreover, the rebuttable presumption provisions allowing for “no conditions” are, in most cases, quite narrow, and there appears to be some confusion as to whether persons other than those statutorily separated out for no conditions can be detained, even if, in their particular cases, no conditions or combination of conditions would suffice to provide reasonable assurance of public safety or court appearance. Combined with the assumption that money protects the public and the various statutory provisions subtly leading judicial officials to use money to respond to risk, the lack of a risk-based detention process likely means that many – if not most – defendants who are perceived to be high risk are being detained purposefully through the unwise and potentially unlawful<sup>101</sup> process of using unattainable secured money bonds. Indeed, an Internet search reveals numerous North Carolina cases of defendants being held bonds in amounts of millions or even tens of millions of dollars, at least suggesting judicial intent to detain. Moreover, one local pretrial release policy reported a “modification” of recommended bond amounts because, “Those who pose the greatest threat [to the community] must not be allowed to roam free while keeping in mind the presumption of innocence.”<sup>102</sup> This statement clearly indicates the use of money to detain.

While it is unclear whether individual judicial districts would, or even could, create a lawful and transparent detention process like the one reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *United States v. Salerno*,<sup>103</sup> such a process could be fairly easily created in the North Carolina statutes. Because detaining someone pretrial involves jailing someone for something the person may or may not do in the future, the Supreme Court has cautioned that pretrial detention provisions must be carefully limited and fair by incorporating numerous procedural due process elements.<sup>104</sup> Detention through the use of money – a practice apparently used widely throughout North Carolina – simply does not measure up to that standard.

The closest North Carolina law comes to providing the required due process fairness elements to its detention procedure is through the fairly limited findings necessary for its rebuttable presumption cases, and the mandate in G.S. § 15A-434 (b) that judicial officials record in writing the reasons for imposing a secured bond, but only to the extent required by local pretrial release policies. Thus, while G.S. § 15A-535(a) requires the creation of such local policies, it merely allows districts to decide whether to include a further requirement that judicial officials make written records.<sup>105</sup> None of the

---

<sup>101</sup> As mentioned previously, using the release process to detain defendants by using money potentially violates both substantive and procedural due process, equal protection notions, and the prohibition against excessive bail.

<sup>102</sup> *In the Matter of Promulgating Local Rules Relating to Bail, Judicial District 8A*, at 1.

<sup>103</sup> 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

<sup>104</sup> *See id.* at 747-52.

<sup>105</sup> *See* G.S. § 15A-535(a) (directing that policies “*may* include . . . a requirement that each judicial official who imposes condition (4) or (5) in G.S. 15A-434(a) must record the reasons for doing so in writing.” (emphasis added)).

local pretrial release policies reviewed by this author contain detention provisions remotely similar to the provisions favorably reviewed in *Salerno*, which were described by the Court as a “full blown adversary hearing.”<sup>106</sup> Moreover, at least one local pretrial release policy requires judicial officials to provide reasons only for secured amounts falling above those provided in the schedule of recommended amounts.<sup>107</sup> Others provide check-box forms for the required reasons.<sup>108</sup> Still others appear to have no record requirement at all.

### *North Carolina Law: The Release Process*

Looking at the release processes broadly, North Carolina’s law is like most other states’ bail laws, in that it is charge-based, overly reliant upon financial conditions, does not include provisions for empirical risk assessment, has limits upon pretrial services agency supervision, and tends naturally to point to the use of mostly secured money bonds administered by commercial sureties. The North Carolina statute does not have the feel of a statute cobbled together over the decades; indeed, it appears to have much more direction and cohesive intent than most other state’s bail laws. Nevertheless, it also appears to have grown over time simply to respond to the various crimes separated out for different pretrial treatment.<sup>109</sup> Like most states, there are some good provisions, such as an express presumption for release on recognizance or unsecured bond,<sup>110</sup> but there are also some bad ones, such as those requiring money to address public safety and permitting “bond doubling.”<sup>111</sup>

As previously noted, believing that the legal right that defendants enjoy pretrial is a right merely to have “conditions set” can lead to significant hindrances when secured money remains one of those conditions. Quite broadly, secured money conditions cause the two most significant problems we see in the field of pretrial justice: (1) the unnecessary and often unlawful detention of low and medium risk defendants for failure to pay the security necessary for release; and (2) the unwise release of extremely high risk defendants who have the money necessary to obtain release. People often equate the first problem as one representing a lack of fairness, but North Carolina should realize that detaining low and medium risk persons unnecessarily for even short periods of time also causes increases in new criminal activity and failures to appear for court both short- and long-term. Thus, the more that the North Carolina release process can be improved to quickly assess and release all eligible defendants, but especially low and medium risk defendants, the more public safety will be enhanced.

The statute currently attempts to do this through its presumption of release under either a written promise to appear or an unsecured bond,<sup>112</sup> but because there

---

<sup>106</sup> *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 750.

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., *Bail Policies for the Judicial District Twenty-Nine-B*, at 3.

<sup>108</sup> See, e.g., *In the Matter of Promulgating Local Rules Relating to Bail and Pretrial Release for Judicial District 30A*, at 17-18.

<sup>109</sup> See, e.g., G.S. 15A-534(d2) (special procedure for probationer charged with a felony).

<sup>110</sup> G.S. § 15A-534(b).

<sup>111</sup> See, e.g., G.S. 15A-534(d1) (requiring bond doubling after failure to appear).

<sup>112</sup> G.S. § 15A-534(b).

exist no provisions concerning the use of empirically-derived risk assessment instruments, North Carolina judicial officials must attempt to assess risk mostly clinically – that is, based on their experience, with untested and unweighted statutory factors and with a series of possibly faulty assumptions about the pretrial process.<sup>113</sup> Accordingly, the presumption of release on a written promise or unsecured bond<sup>114</sup> can be easily and possibly incorrectly overcome with little evidence.

Empirically-derived risk assessment is considered to be a prerequisite to effective reform because knowing pretrial risk is the first step toward placing the right defendants in the right places during the pretrial phase of a criminal case. A second prerequisite is risk management. In many jurisdictions, risk management is done most effectively through the use of pretrial services agencies, which assess defendants for pretrial risk, make recommendations to courts, and then supervise defendants using minimal to intensive supervision techniques. In North Carolina, the statute mentions such programs,<sup>115</sup> but places severe limitations on their use by requiring both the pretrial entity to accept defendants into the program and the defendants to consent to be placed under supervision. The far better practice using both of these prerequisites is for judicial officials to base their release and detention decisions on empirically-derived risk assessment, and then to order released defendants to pretrial supervision, which might range from a simple phone call reminder to more intensive supervision, depending on the risk.

The primary bail-setting provision in North Carolina involves judicial officials setting at least one of five main conditions, from a written promise to appear to house arrest with a secured bond,<sup>116</sup> but, again, the lack of empirical risk assessment and the proper use of pretrial services agency supervision likely pushes judicial officials toward the more restrictive of these conditions to address mostly subjective notions of pretrial risk.

Making sure that the release or detention decision is structured properly and done right in the first instance can virtually eliminate any acute need for review of *unattainable* conditions. Nevertheless, there is often still some need for a failsafe to make sure the decision is effectuated, and it is absolutely crucial in any system that has not yet made improvements reducing the need for later review. In North Carolina, magistrates may modify a pretrial release order at any time prior to the first appearance

---

<sup>113</sup> See § *id.*, § 15A-534(c). These types of factors were included in most state statutes in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), as a way to avoid arbitrary bail setting by incorporating individualizing elements. Nevertheless, without statistically-derived risk assessment, judicial officials are likely to look at a statutory factor such as the “nature and circumstances of the offense charged,” G.S. § 15A-534(c), incorrectly assume that a higher charge would lead to a higher risk of pretrial misbehavior, and thus be moved toward using more restrictive conditions, such as secured bonds.

<sup>114</sup> The presumption also includes release on option number three, release to the custody of a designated person or organization, but if a judicial official chooses this option, defendants are allowed to choose to post a secured bond instead. See G.S. § 15A-534(a).

<sup>115</sup> G.S. § 15A-534(b).

<sup>116</sup> *Id.* §§15A-534(a)(1)-(5).

before a judge,<sup>117</sup> but it appears that there is no formal process for subsequent mandatory review of bonds for misdemeanor defendants who are not released in the first instance.<sup>118</sup> This appears to be a significant gap in the North Carolina statute that must be fixed regardless of any additional improvements.

### *North Carolina Law: The Role of Local Pretrial Release Policies*

North Carolina G.S. § 15A-535(a) requires senior resident superior court judges to create and issue local pretrial release policies to help in “determining whether, and upon what conditions, a defendant may be released before trial.” This statutory language indicates that policies might be drafted to potentially supplement various elements missing from the statute, including important elements as a process to detain extremely high risk defendants. Overall, however, the various local pretrial release policies reviewed for this report illustrate mostly varying re-statements of the current statutory requirements along with the inclusion of money-based bail schedules. The policies vary widely in length, in age, in amounts included in the schedules, and, unfortunately, even in articulation of what should be uniform statements of the purposes of pretrial release and detention. Some local pretrial release policies would be rated as very good when held up to legal and evidence-based practices, but others most certainly would not. One frequent problem observed throughout the policies is an articulation of assumptions or rationales based primarily on experience rather than research or the law, and thus policies seeking only to follow the law and the pretrial research would likely look significantly different than the policies this author reviewed. Indeed, even elements within the various policies incorporated without any rationale (indicating, perhaps, universal acceptance), such as monetary bail bond schedules, would likely be eliminated after a review of the law and the evidence.

While there may be a place in pretrial justice for local determination of various details surrounding release and detention, the mechanism incorporated in North Carolina to do so could be improved. This notion should not be read merely to suggest the need for uniformity among the various bail schedules because the use of a traditional money bail schedule is simply not a legal or evidence-based practice. Instead, it should be read to indicate recognition that some local control could be built into a statewide pretrial justice system, but only after statewide issues are fully understood and addressed. Only after a thorough study of bail and no bail in North Carolina can the state likely assess which elements must be addressed in the statute and which can be left to individual judicial districts.<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>117</sup> *Id.* § 15A-534(e).

<sup>118</sup> *See id.* §15A-601(a) (limiting the first appearance provisions to felony defendants); § 15A-614 (requiring release eligibility review for felony defendants).

<sup>119</sup> As one example, a state might allow local flexibility in determining the “cut-offs” on a particular risk instrument, but only after that state determines broadly who should be released and detained pretrial, decides to use an empirical risk instrument, determines which instrument to use, and then decides that cut-off flexibility within a given range is even desirable.

## Legal Framework Needed to Implement Legal and Evidence-Based Practices in North Carolina

Incorporating legal and evidence-based practices into a state's pretrial release laws typically requires substantial revision to those laws. Knowledge of legal and evidence-based practices often leads to a series of discreet changes, which quickly add up to large-scale revisions. Moreover, simply trying to incorporate a single element of bail reform – such as, for example, risk assessment – can lead to the need to address multiple statutory sections using charge as its primary proxy for risk. Thus, even targeted reforms can require significant statutory changes. Rather than attempting to re-write North Carolina's pretrial statutes, this report recommends broad statutory changes that will need to be fine-tuned by the people of North Carolina. For example, while this report recommends creating a preventive detention provision based on risk, it leaves to North Carolina the determination of who, exactly, should be detained and how best to make that happen.<sup>120</sup>

North Carolina officials likely wish to know both what they can accomplish with little or no changes to the law as well as what changes are absolutely necessary to create a legal and evidence-based system of release and detention. To determine this, we look primarily at the two crucial elements of legal and evidence-based pretrial practices: (1) risk assessment; and (2) risk management surrounding both release and detention, including the elimination of a secured money bond's potential to interfere with either release or detention.

**Risk Assessment:** Without any statutory alteration, local pretrial release policies could incorporate empirically-derived risk assessment into their decision-making framework.<sup>121</sup> This change would serve to better inform judicial officials as to which defendants should be released and which should be detained pretrial. However, it would also likely further highlight deficiencies in the current statutory release and detention scheme based, in large part, on criminal charge and secured-money bail (especially to purposefully detain high risk defendants).

Incorporating empirically-derived assessment could also be done without altering the current statutory risk factors that are neither tested nor weighted for prediction of pretrial risk.<sup>122</sup> However, it can cause confusion to have two sets of factors to assess risk. Moreover, having two sources for risk assessment can lead to an unacceptable number of unnecessary overrides to the empirical instrument, and can also lead to decisions that are actually less accurate than when based on the empirical set alone.

---

<sup>120</sup> General recommendations can, however, be quite useful as a starting point. In Colorado, for example, the State Crime Commission released three broad recommendations concerning pretrial release (increase the use of evidence-based practices including empirical risk assessment, increase the use of pretrial services agencies, and reduce the use of money), and those three recommendations led to a comprehensive, line-by-line overhaul of the bail statute.

<sup>121</sup> Indeed, this has apparently already been done to some extent in Judicial District 26, which has adopted the Arnold Foundation's PSA-Court tool.

<sup>122</sup> See G.S. § 15A-534(c).

For these reasons, in addition to empirical risk assessment's importance as a prerequisite to pretrial improvements, North Carolina should consider ways to encourage (if not mandate) and optimize, through its laws, the use of empirically-derived risk assessment instruments statewide.

**Risk Management – Release:** Without statutory amendment, judicial officials could also initially release virtually all (in the aggregate) low and medium risk defendants (as well as some high risk defendants deemed safe enough to manage outside of secure detention) on a written promise to appear or an unsecured bond, which would eliminate the tendency for secured bonds to interfere with the release of defendants deemed suitable for supervision in the community. Like risk assessment, however, there are strong reasons (including various assumptions surrounding the efficacy of money) for North Carolina to enact proactive statutory changes to dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, the use of secured money at bail.

Moreover, a key element of risk management for released defendants is pretrial supervision using differential supervision techniques based on the risk principle for both public safety and court appearance. However, the statute currently places restrictions on that supervision by not mandating such programs and by not making such supervision mandatory when the judicial official believes it necessary.<sup>123</sup> Thus, even if judicial districts created their own pretrial release programs, the various limitations might make it likely that few defendants would participate. Accordingly, while judicial districts might make progress on their own, statutory guidance and/or mandates are likely necessary.

**Risk Management – Detention:** Judicial officials must also have the ability to detain pretrial extremely high risk defendants through a due process-laden procedure complying with the principles articulated in *United States v. Salerno*.<sup>124</sup> Because North Carolina law does not currently allow this (instead, it requires conditions of release to be set for all defendants except for those not entitled to conditions pursuant to statute based primarily on charge), the law must be changed.

Pretrial detention using unattainable money amounts is likely unlawful under multiple legal theories. Accordingly, even if a judicial district incorporates significant procedural due process protections before setting an unattainable money bond, that bond might still be challenged under other theories, such as substantive due process, excessive bail, or equal protection grounds.<sup>125</sup> As noted previously, money at bail can also pose significant public safety problems, and when money is used to detain, its use tends also to bleed into cases with defendants posing lower risk, leading to additional issues of fairness. Moreover, even states having robust preventive detention provisions

---

<sup>123</sup> See G.S. § 15A-534(b).

<sup>124</sup> 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

<sup>125</sup> For example, recent federal lawsuits challenging the use of unattainable financial conditions on equal protection grounds have led to settlements practically eliminating the use of secured financial conditions. Any jurisdiction looking into pretrial justice must always consider the possibility that secured money bonds as a condition of release might one day be simply removed as a lawful alternative.

often see those provisions ignored when secured money is left in the process.<sup>126</sup> The only way to leave money in the system and yet make sure that it does nothing to hinder either release or detention of defendants pretrial is to incorporate a mandate that the amount not lead to detention,<sup>127</sup> which, in turn, highlights the importance of creating a proper risk-based detention provision to begin with.

Accordingly, there is much that can be done without legislation, but it would require massively coordinated efforts by all judicial districts (and judicial officials within those districts) and an almost inconceivable change in current judicial and public culture. For example, under current law, judicial districts could incorporate risk instruments into their decision-making frameworks, create pretrial services programs to perform evidence-based risk management functions, systematically release all low and medium risk defendants on written promises to appear or unsecured bonds, convince those defendants to agree to pretrial services agency supervision, and use unattainable secured bonds, albeit likely unlawfully, to detain defendants with unmanageable risk and who fall outside of the categories of cases eligible for “no conditions.” Such a system would resemble a “model” pretrial release and detention system, but having such a system arise organically across North Carolina is highly unlikely to happen. And even if it did, the option of using money to detain might be challenged and curtailed or eliminated, forcing North Carolina to once again revisit its laws concerning release and detention. The better option is for North Carolina to instead consider comprehensive changes to its laws now, prior to potentially being forced.

---

<sup>126</sup> For example, numerous officials from Wisconsin have report privately that their preventive detention provision is not used primarily because it is cumbersome compared to using secured money bail. In Colorado, judges routinely avoid using a much less robust provision and rely, instead, on secured money bonds to detain high risk defendants.

<sup>127</sup> The relevant American Bar Association Pretrial Release Standard states: “The judicial officer should not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the defendant solely due to an inability to pay.” *American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (3<sup>rd</sup> Ed.) Pretrial Release* (2007) Std. 10-5.3 (a) at 110. The federal and the District of Columbia statutes each have provisions prohibiting judges from ordering financial conditions that result in the pretrial detention of the defendant. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (c)(2); D.C. Stat. § 23-1321(c)(3).

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

North Carolina should implement the following recommendations for achieving a 21<sup>st</sup> Century legal and evidence-based pretrial release system that will allow for the simultaneous movement toward all three goals of the pretrial release decision – public safety, court appearance, and release for bailable defendants.<sup>128</sup> The recommendations are presented as short-term (to be accomplished in the next 18 months), mid-term (to be accomplished within three years), and long-term (to be accomplished within the next five years.)

### *Short-Term Recommendations*

**Judicial officials should immediately begin issuing unsecured bonds for pretrial release instead of secured bonds.**

Current law allows for a number of pretrial release options, including the issuance of unsecured bonds—those that require payment only upon a defendant’s failure to appear in court. As noted in this report, judicial officials have relied on secured bonds more out of habit than evidence.<sup>129</sup> But as noted earlier, research has demonstrated that unsecured bonds are equally as effective at assuring public safety and appearance as secured bonds.<sup>130</sup> Unsecured bonds offer the additional benefit of resulting in substantially less pretrial detention than secured bonds.<sup>131</sup> Given that research, plus the North Carolina statute requiring that judicial officials select the least restrictive release option,<sup>132</sup> there is no reason why unsecured bonds could not immediately begin replacing secured bonds. The expanded use of unsecured bonds will go a long way to eliminating poverty-based incarceration in the state.

**Appoint a Legal and Evidence-Based Practices Implementation Team to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of this report.**

The purpose of the Implementation Team would be to collaboratively identify and guide a data-driven approach to pretrial justice that works for North Carolina, incorporating the law and the best empirical research to best achieve the three goals of the pretrial release decision. Team members should be well-respected leaders of their stakeholder groups, capable getting buy-in from their colleagues, and fully committed to implementing legal and evidence-based pretrial release practices in the state. The Team should be comprised of representatives of the judiciary, court administration, prosecution, defense, law enforcement, jail administrators, victims, state legislators, and county elected officials.

---

<sup>128</sup> See Section I (discussing the importance of a balanced approach to pretrial justice).

<sup>129</sup> *Supra*, p. 1.

<sup>130</sup> *Supra*, note 16.

<sup>131</sup> *Id.*

<sup>132</sup> G.S. 15A-534(b).

The Implementation Team should be authorized to appoint sub-committees, and members to those subcommittees, to help implement these recommendations.

The Implementation Team should develop a vision statement for a state-wide, data-driven pretrial justice system in North Carolina.

Guided by the information and recommendations in this report, the Implementation Team should create a vision statement that describes a legal and evidence-based pretrial justice system for North Carolina that encompasses the three goals of the pretrial release decision. (See Appendix D for examples of vision statements of jurisdictions working to implement legal and evidence-based pretrial justice practices.)

The Implementation Team should develop an Implementation Plan based upon the vision statement with a focus on initially implementing the plan in 5 to 7 pilot counties.

Achieving the vision in a timely manner will require an implementation plan that will serve as a roadmap and timeline for putting vision components into practice. In keeping with recognized implementation science and strategy, it is recommended that the Implementation Team focus on implementing this plan in 5 to 7 of the state's counties (i.e., a mix of urban, suburban and rural). This will allow for "pilot" testing of the tools and policies and procedures, so that wrinkles in implementation can be ironed out before a statewide roll-out of the plan.

The Implementation Team should incorporate the following elements in its plan:

The use of an empirically-derived pretrial risk assessment tool by every magistrate in every criminal case at the initial appearance.

Given the benefits of the Arnold Foundation's PSA-Court tool, as described earlier,<sup>133</sup> this tool should be the first choice for North Carolina. As noted earlier, the tool is not publicly available yet, but the Implementation Team should work with the Arnold Foundation to try to approximate a time when it might be available to the state. If the tool will not be available when the team is otherwise ready to begin implementing this plan in the pilot counties, then the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) should offer a workable alternative.<sup>134</sup> The VPRAI was empirically tested in multiple jurisdictions in a state that borders North Carolina, which should provide some confidence that it would perform well in North Carolina. Whatever tool is selected should be subjected to a validation study.

---

<sup>133</sup> *Supra*, p. 22.

<sup>134</sup> The Committee received information about the VPRAI at its February 12, 2016 Committee meeting from Kenneth Rose, Pretrial Coordinator, VA Department of Criminal Justice Studies. Information presented by Mr. Rose is posted on the NCCALJ's website (<http://nccalj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Commission-Presentation-1.pdf>).

The use of a release/detention matrix that factors risk level and charge type.

The Implementation Team should seek consensus on a matrix that would provide guidance to magistrates and judges in pretrial release decision-making.<sup>135</sup>

The development of differentiated risk management procedures that match the identified risk to the appropriate supervision level.

As noted in the report, about 60% of North Carolina counties are not served by pretrial services programs.<sup>136</sup> Even in many of those counties that have such programs, supervision capacity is limited. With 100 counties in the state, many that are rural, implementing legal and evidence-based pretrial risk management practices in every part of the state is a challenge that the Implementation Team must address. There are two different approaches that the Team should explore.

The first approach would be establishing a statewide pretrial services program, with the capacity to supervise defendants released by the court with conditions in every part of the state. Kentucky has had statewide pretrial services since the 1970s, and New Jersey is in the process of implementing statewide pretrial services. A statewide pretrial services would offer several benefits: (1) it would assure supervision services are provided uniformly throughout the state; (2) it would assure standardized supervision practices; and (3) it would require a standardized data system for recording supervision activities and outcomes.

The second approach would be for the counties to run but the states to fully or substantially fund pretrial services programs in the state. This approach is used in Virginia, where the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services provides funding for 29 pretrial services programs that serve 97 of Virginia's 133 localities.<sup>137</sup> This arrangement is authorized by statute.<sup>138</sup>

Regardless of the approach used, the Implementation Team should remember that supervision services should be reserved only for those defendants who need them, given their risk levels. As noted earlier, supervising low risk defendants has no beneficial impact on increasing their already high rates of success.<sup>139</sup>

One intervention that all defendants, regardless of their risk level, should receive is a court date reminder. The research, cited earlier, has made clear that the simple act of reminding defendants of their upcoming court dates has a significant impact on improving court appearance rates.<sup>140</sup> The technology is available, and is becoming

---

<sup>135</sup> See *supra* p. 23 (discussing the use of such matrices).

<sup>136</sup> *Supra*, p. 17.

<sup>137</sup> *Comprehensive Community Corrections Act and Pretrial Services Act Annual Report, July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2014*, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (2014), at 1.

<sup>138</sup> Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-152.2.

<sup>139</sup> *Pretrial Risk Assessment in Federal Court*, *supra* note 54.

<sup>140</sup> *Supra* notes 62 and 63.

increasingly affordable, to establish automated systems that can call or text such reminder notices.

### The expanded use of citations by law enforcement

As discussed above, expanding the use of citations in lieu of arrest in appropriate cases is an important strategy for achieving a balanced approach to pretrial justice, and it already has been successfully implemented in at least one state.<sup>141</sup> North Carolina law already allows law enforcement to issue a citation for any misdemeanor or infraction.<sup>142</sup> The Implementation Team should work with law enforcement agencies throughout the state to identify the opportunities for expanding the use of citations, and to see if the obstacles that exist to doing so can be addressed.

### Early involvement of prosecutor and defense counsel

Given the benefits, described in Section III, of having a prosecutor screen cases before the initial pretrial release decision and for both prosecution and defense to be present at that hearing, the Implementation Team should identify how to make this happen. The State of Delaware, which, like North Carolina, has a 24/7 magistrate system, already is seeking to do this. Officials have set up special procedures for persons charged with certain felony offenses in that state's largest jurisdiction – Wilmington. Instead of having Magistrate Court 24/7 for those defendants, one court session is held at 8am and another at 8pm. This makes it easier for prosecution and defense to be present and making appropriate representations to the magistrate on the issue of pretrial release. Officials will take what they learn from this pilot effort to see if they can overcome the challenges presented by staffing initial appearances with prosecutors and defenders for indigent defendants.

### The institution of automatic bond review procedures for misdemeanor defendants.

As discussed above, some in-custody defendants do not receive timely review of their release conditions.<sup>143</sup> Misdemeanor defendants who are in custody on secured bonds set by the magistrate should have an automatic review of that decision at the next regular session of district court. The Implementation Team should assess whether making this happen will require a statutory change, a change in court rules, a policy directive, or some other action.

### Uniform data reporting standards

Collecting the data elements listed in Section IV and required for an effective pretrial justice system would involve every state law enforcement agency, and jail and the court system. To achieve the purposes of data collection for implementing this plan, it would be ideal if there was a uniform data system among all law enforcement agencies

---

<sup>141</sup> *Supra* pp. 24-25.

<sup>142</sup> G.S. 15A-302(a).

<sup>143</sup> *Supra* p. 26.

and a uniform system among all jails. This may or may not be a practical option. Another approach may be to develop data reporting standards that the appropriate entities would follow. For example, every law enforcement agency would report to a central entity every month how many citations were issued, and for what charges. Every jail would report monthly on the percent of the total population that is held on secured bonds, and the length of stay of those persons, by their risk level.<sup>144</sup> The Implementation Team should work with the state's law enforcement agencies and jails to assess the best ways to implement such data reporting standards.

The Implementation Team should draft language for bills or proposed court rules that incorporate the changes in law needed to implement the plan in the pilot counties.

The Implementation Team should develop a preventive detention framework for defendants who present unacceptably high risk.

As noted above, North Carolina does not have a preventive detention statute that allows for the detention of defendants who present unacceptably high risk.<sup>145</sup> As a result, very risky defendants with resources can buy their way out jail, even when very high bonds are set. The Implementation Team should draft proposed legislation and court rules to establish a preventive detention provision similar to the provision reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *United States v. Salerno*<sup>146</sup> (albeit incorporating risk).

The Implementation Team should develop a release framework for defendants who are not detained.

For releasable defendants, the Implementation Team should draft and North Carolina should enact legislation and court rules to give North Carolina judicial officials broad discretion to use legal and evidence-based practices to: (1) effectuate release quickly; (2) successfully manage defendants in the community through conditions and supervision techniques shown by research to be effective at achieving the purposes of pretrial release and; and (3) respond to pretrial failure that does not lead to detention. If money is to be left in such a system, the state should enact a provision mandating that no condition of release lead to the detention of an otherwise releasable defendant. The law should expressly articulate the use of "least restrictive" conditions, and encourage courts to monitor defendants to increase or decrease the use of conditions to respond to changes in risk. Moreover, the law should be changed to provide that no otherwise releasable defendant may be detained for failure to meet a release condition.

The Implementation Team should draft other legislation and/or court rules needed to implement the recommendations in this report.

The Implementation Team should draft and the state should enact provisions mandating the use of the chosen empirically-derived risk assessment instrument, the adoption of a decision-making framework (possibly statewide) designed to guide release

---

<sup>144</sup> See *supra* pp. 26-27 (listing other data needs).

<sup>145</sup> See *supra* pp. 36-37 (discussing this).

<sup>146</sup> See *supra* note 89.

and detention decision-making, and the creation of pretrial services programs to use differential supervision methods on all defendants for both public safety and court appearance.<sup>147</sup> It should eliminate the use of traditional money bail bond schedules based on charge. It should enact provisions for the speedy review of pretrial conditions in all cases. It should amend or repeal those provisions in North Carolina law not compatible with these recommendations. And finally, it should actively oppose any future legislation that runs counter to these recommendations.

### *Mid-Term Recommendations*

The Implementation Team should fully implement the plan in the pilot counties.

While some aspects of the plan may be implemented during the short-term period, the Implementation Team should make every effort to implement the full plan in the pilot sites during this period.

The Implementation Team should ensure that all staff with a role in implementing the plan are fully informed of its purpose and rationale and trained for successful implementation.

One of the most important keys to successful implementation of any plan is fidelity by those responsible for carrying out the plan day-to-day. If the plan is not executed as intended, the intended results will not be achieved.

Training should be included as a key part in the implementation plan. At a minimum, information and training sessions should be directed to bail-setting judicial officials, law enforcement officers, assistant district attorneys, assistant public defenders, and pretrial services staff or others who have a role in pretrial supervision.

The Implementation Team should establish a data dashboard to monitor outcomes and regularly review the data and make appropriate adjustments to the plan

The team should assess what changes need to be made to the data infrastructure in place in county jails and the courts to be able to gather the data elements listed in Section III of this report.

### *Long-Term Recommendations*

The Implementation Team should begin implementing the plan in the remaining counties of the state.

---

<sup>147</sup> Although it is perhaps ideal, pretrial services functions do not necessarily have to be performed by government entities. For example, in Colorado, two entities – one for-profit and one nonprofit – help jurisdictions with release using methods that are similar, if not identical to, public pretrial agency functions. It bears repeating, however, that legal and evidence based pretrial supervision does not include supervision through a commercial surety using a financially-based contract.

Based on the experiences of the pilot projects, the Team should start implementing the plan throughout the state.

The Implementation Team should develop a plan for sustaining changes that have been made and holding accountable those that make the changes.

Sustaining change can be very difficult, particularly as those who pushed for the changes move on. North Carolina leaders and stakeholders should be mindful of this and develop a plan for sustaining reforms. This involves ensuring that statutes and court rules codify these policies. It also involves robust reporting systems and transparency for the public about the risk profile of North Carolina's arrestee population, how risk assessments are used, and how risk-based supervision strategies are being employed and the results they are producing regarding public safety and appearance in court.

North Carolina officials should consider what role, if any, secured bonds should continue to play in the state's pretrial system, and draft appropriate proposals for statutory or court rule amendments.

As North Carolina's plan for a legal and evidence-based approach to pretrial justice unfolds, it should become increasingly clear that the continued use of secured bonds is incompatible with that approach, and it will be much easier to make the case for completely replacing secured bonds with recognizance or unsecured-bond releases.

## APPENDIX A. VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT

Risk Factor	Criteria	Assigned Points
Charge Type	If most serious charge for the current offense is a felony	1
Pending Charge(s)	If the defendant has one or more charges pending in court at the time of the arrest	1
Criminal History	If the defendant has one or more misdemeanor or felony convictions	1
Failure to Appear	If the defendant has two or more failure to appears	2
Violent Convictions	If the defendant has two or more violent convictions	1
Current Residence	If the defendant has lived at the current residence for less than one year prior to the arrest	1
Employed/Child Caregiver	If the defendant has not been employed continuously for the previous two years and was not the primary caregiver for a child at the time of arrest	1
History of Drug Abuse	If the defendant has a history of drug abuse	1

Risk Level	Risk Score
Low	0,1 points
Below Average	2 points
Average	3 points
Above Average	4 points
High	5 – 9 points

## APPENDIX B. VIRGINIA PRETRIAL PRAXIS

Risk Level/ Charge Category	Traffic: Non- DUI	Non- violent misd.	Theft/ Fraud	Traffic: DUI	Drug	Failure To Appear	Firearm	Violent
<i>Low Risk</i>								
PR or UA Bond	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretrial Supervision	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supervision Level	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	I	II	II
<i>Below Average Risk</i>								
PR or UA Bond	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pretrial Supervision	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supervision Level	N/A	N/A	I	I	I	II	II	II
<i>Average Risk</i>								
PR or UA Bond	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pretrial Supervision	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Supervision Level	I	I	II	II	II	III	N/A	N/A
<i>Above Average Risk</i>								
PR or UA Bond	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Pretrial Supervision	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Supervision Level	I	I	II	III	III	N/A	N/A	N/A
<i>High Risk</i>								
PR or UA Bond	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Pretrial Supervision	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Supervision Level	II	II	III	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

PR or UA Bond – Yes = Recommended for Personal Recognizance or Unsecured Appearance Bond, No = Not Recommended

Pretrial Supervision – Yes = Recommended for Pretrial Supervision, No = Not Recommended

Supervision Level – [I, II and III] = Recommended Level of Supervision, N/A = Supervision not recommended (level not applicable)

## APPENDIX C. VIRGINIA DIFFERENTIAL PRETRIAL SUPERVISION

Condition	Level I	Level II	Level III
Court date reminder for every court date	√	√	√
Criminal history check before court date	√	√	√
Face-to-face contact once a month	√		
Face-to-face contact every other week		√	
Face-to-face contact every week			√
Alternative contact once a month (telephone, email, text, as approved locally)	√		
Alternative contact every other week (telephone, email, text, as approved locally)		√	
Special condition compliance verification	√	√	√

## APPENDIX D. EXAMPLES OF VISION STATEMENTS

### *Vision Statement of the Delaware Smart Pretrial Policy Team*

We envision a fair pretrial system that relies on individualized decisions based on risk and the effective use of resources to honor individual rights, protect public safety and promote the administration of justice.

#### Ten things we know to be true...

1. We can work well together.
2. Delaware's small size is an asset.
3. Reliable data driven decisions lead to a more objective and reliable system.
4. Meaningful options for supervision will make a better pretrial system.
5. We want to live in a safe community.
6. We must move forward with a risk-based system.
7. More information for bail decisions is better than less.
8. Lack of community-based mental health and substance abuse services contribute to our pretrial detentioner population.
9. Innovation does not have to come at a cost.
10. Sustainability requires commitment.

#### In our ideal system we would...

Work together,  
Protect an individual's right to liberty,  
Protect the safety of our community,  
Use resources efficiently,  
Make risk informed choices,  
Utilize meaningful evidence based supervision options for our pretrial system, and  
Recognize the impact that pretrial decisions have on individuals, the community, and the judicial process.

### *Vision Statement of the Denver, Colorado Smart Pretrial Policy Team*

Pretrial decisions are equitable, fiscally responsible, and data informed; they recognize the presumption of release and reasonably ensure appearance in court with a commitment to public safety.

#### Guiding Principles

- 1) Release and detain decisions for all defendants should be risk based, individualized, and consider the safety and needs of the community. Release decisions shall be informed by an empirical pretrial risk assessment.
- 2) Pretrial processes shall maintain the presumption of release, equality, justice, and due process.
- 3) Pretrial risk can be lessened for some risk levels with the use of appropriate pretrial supervision conditions.

- 4) Pretrial system decisions should be research based and evaluated based on continuing data outcome evaluation.
- 5) The collaboration of the stakeholders in the pretrial justice process is essential to establish system best practices.

### *Vision Statement of the Yakima County, Washington Smart Pretrial Policy Team*

The vision of Yakima County is to operate a pretrial system that is safe, fair, and effective and which maximizes public safety, court appearance, and appropriate use of release, supervision, and detention.

## APPENDIX E. FACTORS INCLUDED IN THE ARNOLD FOUNDATION PSA COURT RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL

- Whether the current offense is violent
- Whether the person had a pending charge at the time of the current offense
- Whether the person has a prior misdemeanor conviction
- Whether the person has a prior felony conviction
- Whether the person has prior convictions for violent crimes
- The person's age at the time of arrest
- How many times the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing in the last two years
- Whether the person failed to appear at a pretrial hearing more than two years ago
- Whether the person has previously been sentenced to incarceration.