scope of resentencing on remand after sentence of mandatory life without parole (LWOP) for a juvenile is vacated in light of Miller v. Alabama; trial court did not err in failing to disturb unrelated consecutive sentences for armed robbery on remand from vacated LWOP sentence for felony murder; argument regarding propriety of consecutive sentences for unrelated convictions aggregated with vacated LWOP sentence for felony murder was waived where counsel conceded unrelated convictions were not before the court at resentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding consecutive sentences for felony murder and kidnapping failed because the defendant could not demonstrate make required showing of prejudice; court declined to address and dismissed without prejudice ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding Miller's prohibition against disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment by imposing LWOP because of conflicting opinions regarding the constitutionality of de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles and pendency of appeal before North Carolina Supreme Court that will resolve this issue

Error to subject records under N.C. Gen. Stat. 58-10-430 to subpoena; no error to subject records under N.C. Gen. Stat. 58-30-62 to subpoena.

Involuntary Commitment; Certiorari; Due Process; Findings of Fact

Dependency; permanency planning; constitutionally protected status; parental status; clear and convincing evidence; subject matter jurisdiction

Involuntary Commitment; Certiorari; Due Process; Findings of Fact

Preservation, Acting in a manner inconsistent with constitutionally protected status, best interest of the child standard

res judicata, small claims action, final judgment

professional responsibility; disqualification of counsel based on conflicts of interest between former counsel and counsel associated in practice with former counsel; conflict imputation to lawyers associated in practice; Rules 1.6, 1.9, and 1.10 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct; no appeal of right exists from the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel; trial court did not err, much less abuse its discretion, in denying motion to disqualify based on imputed conflict between former counsel in the same case who became associated in practice with opposing counsel after representation was terminated